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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
MARLENE STONE,
BRIEF OF THE APPELLEE
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

Appellate Case No.

20090564-CA

RICHARD FLINT and JUDY FLINT,

Civil No.

080907234

Defendants/Appellants.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated
§ 78A-4- 103(2)(j), cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES

1. Rule 401, Utah Rules of Evidence. Definition of "relevant evidence."
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is
of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence.
2. Rule 402, Utah Rules of Evidence. Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrelevant
evidence inadmissible.
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the
United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, or by these rules, or by other rules
applicable in courts of this state. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.
1

3. Rule 801, Utah Rules of Evidence. Definitions.
The following definitions apply under this article:
Statement. A "statement" is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal
conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion.
Declarant. A "declarant" is a person who makes a statement.
Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted.
Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if:
(d)(2) Admission by party-opponent. The statement is offered against a party and
is (A) the party's own statement, in either an individual or a representative
capacity, or (B) a statement of which the party has manifested an adoption or belief
in its truth, or (C) a statement by a person authorized by the party to make a
statement concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by the party's agent or servant
concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or employment, made during
the existence of the relationship, or (E) a statement by a coconspirator of a party
during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. (Amended effective
October 1, 1992)
4. Rule 802, Utah Rules of Evidence. Hearsay rule.
Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by law or by these rules.
5. Rule 803, Utah Rules of Evidence. Hearsay exception; availability of declarant immaterial.
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a
witness:
(3) Then existing mental emotional, or physical condition. A statement of the declarant's
then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive,
design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to
prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation, identification, or
terms of declarant's will. (Amended effective October 1, 1992; November 1, 2001; November 1,
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2004.)
6. Rule 807, Utah Rules of Evidence. Other exceptions.
A statement not specifically covered by Rule 803 or Rule 804 but having equivalent
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness is not excluded by the hearsay rule if the court
determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more
probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure
through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purpose of these rules and the interests of justice will
best be served by admission of the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be
admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently
in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to
meet it, the proponent's intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the name
and address of the declarant. (Added effective November 1, 2004.)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

NATURE OF THE CASE:
On November 13, 2008 Plaintiff, Marlene Stone, filed a Complaint seeking the eviction of
Defendants, Richard Flint and Judy Flint, from 15 acres she had leased to the Defendants on April 16,
2008. The lease was for a one (1) year period and expired on April 17, 2009.
Defendants, Richard Flint and Judy Flint, filed an Answer and Counterclaim on November 21,
2008. In their Counterclaim, Defendants, Flint, allege Plaintiff, Stone, sold three (3) loafing sheds on
her property to the Flints and now refuses to give them the sheds. Flints allege Marlene Stone
breached a Uniform Real Estate Contract and Bill of Sale and/or converted the loafing sheds to her
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benefit. A loafing shed is a portable shed, typically made of metal, that provides shelter and feed to
horses that are pastured and not typically left in a barn.
On February 3, 2009 the parties entered into a Confidential General Release and Settlement
Agreement which was filed with the court on February 13, 2009. The parties stipulated in the Recital
of the Confidential General Release and Settlement Agreement the only remaining issues for the court
are whether three (3) loafing sheds and several non-fixed mobile panels on Marlene Stone's property
are part of a Bill of Sale and Real Estate Purchase Contract, both dated April 16, 2008. The parties
settled the eviction action and wrongful termination of the lease and Defendants, Flints' claim for
trespass and breach of the Covenant for Quiet Enjoyment before the trial.
COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS:
Bench trial was held on April 15, 2009 and April 20, 2009. Pursuant to the Confidential
General Release and Settlement Agreement, Plaintiff, Marlene Stone, dismissed her claim for eviction
as the parties agreed the lease expired on January 2, 2009. Defendants, Richard Flint and Judy Flint,
abandoned their claim of trespassing and breach of Quiet Enjoyment, reserving only whether three (3)
sheds and several non-fixed mobile panels on Plaintiff, Marlene Stone's property, were part of the
Bill of Sale and Real Estate Purchase Contract, both dated April 16, 2008. Paragraph 3 of the
Agreement states the parties agree to stipulate that the legal ownership of the sheds and non-fixed
panels are the sole and remaining issues which are scheduled for trial on April 15, 2009.
DISPOSITION BY THE TRIAL COURT:
Non-jury trial was held on April 15 and April 20, 2009. The trial court issued a Memorandum
Decision on April 21, 2009. The trial court ruled the Real Estate Purchase Contract (REPC)
suspended all prior negotiations, representations, and understandings of the parties, pursuant to
4

paragraph 14 of the REPC. The trial court concluded, as a matter of law, that the REPC and Bill of
Sale are both unambiguous. Defendants, Flint, were awarded all structures that exist on their two (2)
acres at the time of the contract and at the closing. Plaintiff, Marlene Stone, was awarded the three
(3) loafing sheds and panels on her 15 acres.
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were entered on June 1, 2009 and an Order was also
entered that date, dismissing Defendants, Flints' Counterclaim for breach of contract/conversion and
awarded Plaintiff, Marlene Stone, her attorney fees and court costs.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
Plaintiff, Marlene Stone, owned a home and 17 acres of land located in Hooper, Weber
County, Utah and placed it for sale after her husband died (R at 165).
The land, the home, and all the farms appraised for about $1,400,000. (R at 167)
Because the property was so expensive, Marlene Stone agreed to sell part of it so long as she
could still have access to the remaining property. (R at 167)
The boundary lines to a 1-acre parcel or a 2-acre parcel had not been surveyed at the time
Marlene Stone listed the property for sale as she did not want to incur the survey expense if someone
purchased all 17 acres. (R at 167)
On February 1, 2008 Plaintiff, Marlene Stone, met Defendants, Richard Flint and Judy Flint,
and their realtor, Joe Adair, at her home located at 6006 South 7100 West, Hooper, Utah. (R at 167168)
On February 1, 2008 all the parties were in a bedroom of Marlene Stone's home overlooking
her property and barns. Marlene Stone stated, if they wanted two (2) acres she would have to keep 60
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something feet for a road to her remaining property, but the Flints would receive the house and both
barns. Richard Flint asked Marlene Stone, uIs all this stuff going to stay?" (R at 168)
Marlene Stone replied, " Yes, it does." (Rat 168) "Yes. I'm not going to move anything. Fm
going to leave everything right where it is." (R at 170)
Joe Adair, Flints' realtor, testified, we put in the REPC the two (2) acres would be surveyed
and subject to the Flints' approval. (R at 32) Addendum One (1) to the REPC provides seller to have
property surveyed and four (4) corners staked to buyers' approval. Survey to be completed by Greg
Hansen, with Hansen Engineering.
Joe Adair testified Hooper City approved the boundary line changes after surveying the two
(2) acres to be sold to the Flints. It was not approved by Hooper City until right before closing. (R at
33) The two acres surveyed provided for a 66-foot right-of-way to Marlene Stone on the north side of
the Flints' property. (R at 28, 171) Marlene Stone testified, she knew if she did not sell all the
property (17 acres) she would have to survey the property to establish a right-of-way or road to her
remaining 15 acres east of the Flints' two (2) acres of property. (R at 172)
Marlene Stone testified she did not intend to sell the loafing sheds on her 15 acres to Richard
Flint and Judy Flint at the time she signed the REPC. (R at 175)
Marlene Stone leased to the Flints her 15 acres for 10 months on the same day of the real
estate closing. (Rat 175)
Marlene Stone allowed the Flints to use the loafing sheds on her 15 acres for the 10 months
the 15 acres were leased to them. (R at 174) Marlene Stone testified she did not want to move any
loafing sheds off the property the Flints purchased or off the property she kept. (R at 174)
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After the survey was made and the 2 acres sold to the Flints, Marlene Stone had three (3)
loafing sheds on her property and the Flints had three (3) loafing sheds on their two (2) acres, together
with the home and two (2) barns. (R at 175)
Richard Flint testified that Marlene Stone did not indicate to him he was entitled to any
personal property on her 15 acres. (R at 118)
The panels, gates, and loafing sheds the Flints possessed were on their 2 acres and the panels,
gates, and loafing sheds Marlene Stone possessed were all on her 15 acres. (R at 118-120)
Judy Flint testified on February 1, 2008 she had no idea what land actually made up the 2
acres. She and her husband wanted the 2 acres to include the house, horse barn, and hay barn and
wrote up the REPC that way. (R at 154)
Judy Flint testified, once the 66-foot right-of-way was established and their 2 acres staked out
by Hansen surveyors, she did not ever personally have a conversation with Marlene Stone about what
personal property went with their land. (R at 155)
As to the horse walker, Judy Flint testified the main body of the horse walker was on Marlene
Stone's property but the arms of it extended over onto the Flints' 2 acres so when the horses were
being exercised, they would walk on the Stone property and the Flint property. Marlene Stone wanted
the entire horse walker moved onto the Flints' property so that a fence could be erected between the
properties. (Rat 156)
Richard Flint testified, after February 1, 2008 he did not discuss with Marlene Stone about the
loafing sheds and panels that would remain on her property. (R at 114) The subject was not
discussed.
Richard Flint testified the loafing sheds and panels were not moved after the Flints purchased
7

their 2 acres in April, 2008. (R at 114) Everything remained exactly the same. (R at 114) Marlene
Stone had three (3) loafing sheds on her property and the Flints had three (3) loafing sheds on their 2
acres. (Rat 115-116)
Richard Flint testified, the panels and gates he possesses are all on his 2 acres and the panels
and gates Marlene Stone possesses are all on her 15 acres. (R at 118-119) He does not claim she
took his personal property and put them on her property. (R at 118-119)
As to the horse walker, Richard Flint testified the base, a large cement slab, was on Marlene
Stone's property and the arms extended over onto the Flints' property so that horses being exercised
would walk on both properties. (R at 125-131) In paragraph 9 of the Confidential General Release
and Settlement Agreement, the parties stipulate, pursuant to the April 16, 2008 Real Estate Purchase
Contract and accompanying Bill of Sale, the horse walker was to be the property of the Flints and
would be moved onto their property by January 30, 2009 as set forth in paragraph 10.
Defendant, Richard Flint, specifically identified the location of all the loafing sheds, hay barn,
and horse barn on Plaintiffs exhibit 1, a map of the Plaintiffs property and Defendants' two (2)
acres. (R at 31-32, 58) Structure A, B, and E are loafing sheds on Marlene Stone's 66-foot right-ofway. (R at 58) Structure D is a loafing shed on the Flints' two (2) acres. (R at 31-32, 58) Structure
E is a pigeon pen and loafing shed on Marlene Stone's property. (R at 58) Structure F is a loafing
shed on the Flints' property. Structure G is a five-stall horse barn on the Flints' property. (R at 58)
Structure H is a hay barn on the Flints' property. (R at 58) Structure I is a loafing shed on the Flints'
property. (Rat 58)
Structures A, B, and E are loafing sheds on Marlene Stone's 66-foot right-of-way and are the
disputed three (3) loafing sheds in this lawsuit. (R at 67) Richard Flint testified, he thought the three
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(3) loafing sheds; A, B, and E, located on Marlene Stone's property, belonged to him. (R at 74)
The Bill of Sale was prepared by the title company at the time of closing, on April 16, 2008,
and was drafted consistent with the REPC and addendums thereto. (R at 32, 46) The Bill of Sale
states, Marlene Stone sold the buyers, Richard Flint and Judy Flint, certain personal property now at
6006 South 7100 West, Hooper, Utah; particularly described as all lounging and loafing sheds,
panels, gates, fences, waterers, and horse walker as presently exist.
Marlene Stone testified, she use to live at 6006 South 7100 West, Hooper, Utah before she
sold that property to the Flints. (R at 165) The address given by Hooper City for her remaining 15
acres is 5990 South 7100 West, Hooper, Utah. (R at 165)
During the trial, Marlene Stone's attorney objected to the testimony of Jeffrey D. Harris
concerning a conversation between Marlene Stone and Jeffrey Harris about what personal property
was included in the two (2) acres Jeffrey Harris was once considering buying from Marlene Stone.
(R at 133) Plaintiffs counsel objected on the grounds of hearsay (R at 133) and relevance. (R at 136)
The trial court sustained the objection on the grounds of relevance. (R at 136)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

A bench trial was held on Richard and Judy Flint's Counterclaim for breach of contract and
conversion of personal property, to-wit: three (3) loafing sheds and some non-fixed mobile panels.
Buyers, Richard and Judy Flint, and Seller, Marlene Stone, signed a Real Estate Purchase Contract
(REPC) on February 1, 2008 wherein a home located at 6006 South 7100 West, Hooper, Weber
County, Utah; together with two (2) acres of land with a horse barn and hay barn were sold to the
Flints by Marlene Stone.
9

Clause 1.1 of the REPC included fixtures and personal property if presently owned and
attached to the property. This clause also states the following items should also be included in this
sale and conveyed under separate Bill of Sale with warranties as to title: oven/range, refrigerator,
window coverings as presently exist.
Later the same day, Addendum No. One to the REPC was also signed by the parties
incorporating, as part of the REPC: Included items: "all lounging/loafing sheds, panels, gates,
feeders/waterers and horse walker as presently exist. Seller to have property surveyed and four (4)
comers staked to buyers' approval."
The home is described as being located at 6006 South 7100 West, Hooper, Weber County,
Utah. The two (2) acres were to be surveyed and staked at a later time to be approved by the buyers
with the provision the horse bam and hay bam were included. The personal property was to be
described and conveyed under a separate Bill of Sale with warranties as to the title.
The two (2) acres were surveyed later and approved by the buyers prior to the closing on April
16, 2008. The home located at 6006 South 7100 West, Hooper, Utah and the two (2) acres, including
the horse bam and hay bam, were conveyed to the buyers by means of a warranty deed. The personal
property was described and conveyed to the buyer by a Bill of Sale with warranties also at closing on
April 16, 2008.
The Bill of Sale, dated April 16, 2008, conveys to the buyers that certain personal property
located now at 6006 South 7100 West, Hooper, Utah 84315 as follows: oven/range, refrigerator,
window coverings, two (2) water irrigation sheds, all lounging and loafing sheds, panels, gates,
feeders, waterers, and horse walker as presently exist.
Seller, Marlene Stone, was assigned by Hooper City the address of 5990 South 7100 West,
10

Hooper, Utah for her remaining 15 acres of property not sold to the Flints.
Prior to trial on April 15, and April 20, 2009, the parties signed a Confidential General
Release and Settlement Agreement on February 2 and February 3, 2009 and filed it with the court.
The parties stipulated the only remaining issues for the court are whether three (3) sheds and several
non-fixed mobile panels on seller, Marlene Stone's property are part of a Bill of Sale and Real Estate
Purchase Contract, both dated April 16, 2008.
Clause 9 of the Confidential General Release states, it is acknowledged by the parties there is
a horse walker that is located on the Stone's real property, but which is the property of the Flints,
pursuant to an April 16, 2008 Real Estate Purchase Contract and accompanying Bill of Sale, of the
same date of this statement, and is in no way an admission conveying the rightful ownership of the
loafing sheds or any remaining property on the Stone's land and which the Flints claim an interest in
by virtue of said contracts.
Clause 10 states, the Flints agree to remove the horse walker by January 30, 2009 onto their
two (2) acres.
The trial court correctly ruled that clause 1.1 of the REPC is not ambiguous and cannot be
read to include any items of personal property not presently owned and attached to the property
located at 6006 South 7100 West, Hooper, Utah. Accordingly, the three (3) loafing sheds and panels
located on Marlene Stone's remaining 15 acres were not conveyed to the buyers, Richard and Judy
Flint.

Moreover, the Bill of Sale, which in the final, integrated explanation of the parties' intent,
transferred only that certain personal property now at 6006 South 7100 West, Hooper, Utah.
11

Consequently, the Flints are only entitled to receive three (3) loafing sheds and the panels on their two
(2) acres located at 6006 South 7100 West, Hooper, Utah and not those located on Marlene Stone's
remaining 15 acres. The Bill of Sale is not ambiguous and can only be interpreted to convey the
personal property located on the Flints' two (2) acres at the time the Bill of Sale was signed on April
16,2008.
The trial court correctly excluded the testimony of witness, Jeffrey Dean Harris, on grounds of
relevancy. The proffered testimony of Jeffery Harris as to his conversation with seller, Marlene
Stone, concerning his inquiry to purchase two acres and some personal property on a different day,
time, and location was properly excluded based upon Marlene Stone's counsel's objection as to
hearsay and relevancy.
The trial court did not err in excluding and misstating certain alleged salient facts from its
Findings of Fact. Flints argue because seller, Marlene Stone, did not dispute the Flints' right to the
horse walker, feeder, and waterers at trial; that their extrinsic facts are important for the Court to
determine whether the REPC and Bill of Sale are ambiguous. The only trial issues were stipulated to
be awarding of three (3) loafing sheds and various panels located on Marlene Stones' property. The
ownership of the horse walker was stipulated to in the Confidential General Release and the issue of
ownership of feeders and walkers was stipulated not to be a trial issue.
Seller, Marlene Stone, should be awarded her attorney fees on appeal based upon the REPC
and terms of the Confidential General Release, considering she was awarded her costs and attorney
fees at trial.

12

ARGUMENT

I.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT NEITHER THE REAL
ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT NOR THE BILL OF SALE ARE
AMBIGUOUS.

The trial court correctly ruled neither the Real Estate Purchase Contract (REPC) nor the Bill of
Sale, dated April 16, 2008, are ambiguous thereby permitting the trial court to interpret the contracts
as a matter of law.
"The underlying purpose in construing or interpreting a contract is to ascertain the intentions
of the parties to the contract." WebBank v. American Gen. Annuity Svc. Corp., 2002 UT 88, ^ 17, 54
P.3d 1139.
1139. When interpreting a contract, "we look to the writing itself to
ascertain the parties' intentions, and we consider each contract
provision...in relation to all of the others, with a view toward giving
effect to all and ignoring none." "If the language within the four
corners of the contract is unambiguous, the parties' intentions are
determined from the plain meaning of the contractual language, and
the contract may be interpreted as a matter of law." Green River
Canal Co. v. Thayn 2003 UT 42, 84 P. 3d 1134,1141 (Utah 2003).
[5]

H 25 A contractual term or provision is ambiguous "if it is capable
of more than one reasonable interpretation because of 'uncertain
meanings of terms, missing terms, or other facial deficiencies.' "
Dairies v. Vincent 2008 UT 51, 190 P.3d 1269, 1275 (Utah 2008).
Contractual ambiguity can occur in two different contexts: (1)
facial ambiguity with regard to the language of the contract and (2)
ambiguity with regard to the intent of the contracting parties. 907
p.2d at 268. The first context presents a question of law to be
determined by the judge. WebBank 2002 UT 88, ^ 22, 54 P.3d
1139. The second context presents a question of fact where, if the
judge determines that the contract is facially ambiguous, "parol
evidence of the parties' intentions should be admitted." Id, at 12751276.
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In Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Ass 'n* 907 P.2d 264, 268 the Supreme Court of Utah
set forth a two-part standard for determining facial ambiguity. First, we indicated that "[w]hen
determining whether a contract is ambiguous, any relevant evidence must be considered.
Otherwise, the determination of ambiguity is inherently one-sided, namely, it is based solely on
the 'extrinsic evidence of the judge's own linguistic education and experience.' " Second, after a
judge considers relevant and credible evidence of contrary interpretations, the judge must ensure
that "the interpretations contended for are reasonably supported by the language of the contract."
In Dairies v. Vincent, id. at 1276, the Supreme Court of Utah held: In articulating the
Ward rule, we sough to establish a balanced, "better-reasoned" approach to an analysis of facial
ambiguity that would allow judges to "consider the writing in the light of the surrounding
circumstances." Id. However, we did not intend that a judge allow surrounding circumstances to
create ambiguity where the language of a contract would not otherwise permit. In other words,
our statement that "[r]ational interpretation requires at least a preliminary consideration of all
credible evidence," does not create a preference for that evidence over the language of the
contract. Thus, under Ward, a finding of ambiguity after a review of relevant, extrinsic evidence
is appropriate only when "reasonably supported by the language of the contract." Ward, 907
P.2d at 268.
The principles of Ward, id., were succinctly set forth in Cafe Rio, Inc. v. Larkin-GiffordOverton, LLC, 629 Utah Adv. Rep. 21, 22-23 as follows: Under well-accepted rules of contract
interpretation, we look to the language of the contract to determine its meaning and the intent of
the contracting parties. We also "consider each contract pro vision... in relation to all of the
others, with a view toward giving effect to all and ignoring none." Where "the language within
the four corners of the contract is unambiguous, the parties' intentions are determined from the
14

plain meaning of the contractual language, and the contract may be interpreted as a matter of
law." Only if the language of the contract is ambiguous will we consider extrinsic evidence of
the parties' intent. We have explained that "ambiguity exists in a contract term or provision if it
is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation because of uncertain meanings of terms,
missing terms, or other facial deficiencies." Additionally, "[u]nder the well-established rule of
construction ejusdem generis" we determine the meaning of a general contractual term based on
the specific enumerations that surround that term.
The trial court found the present case to be factually similar to Flores v. Earnshaw, 2009
UT 90, 627 Utah Adv. Rep 13. In Flores, the parties disagreed if personal property, as
enumerated in Clause 1.1 of the REPC, was indicated in the sale. The Utah Court of Appeals
held Clause 1.1 was not ambiguous as the personal property was included in the sale if presently
owned and attached to the property. The Court of Appeals ruled the personal property was not
included in the sale because the personal property was not "presently owned and attached to the
property" because the condominium was yet to be built.
In the present case, the trial court ruled the three (3) loafing sheds and panels the Flints
sought were not "presently owned and attached" to the two (2) acres the Flints purchased from
Marlene Stone. It is undisputed, as demonstrated by Plaintiffs exhibit 1, the loafing sheds
labeled A, B, and E, nor the panels, are "presently owned and attached to the property" purchased
by the Flints. The trial court further ruled, the Bill of Sale, which is the final, integrated
expression of the parties' intent, only transferred those items of personal property "now at 6006
South 7100 West, Hooper, Utah." The trial court ruled the three (3) loafing sheds and panels
located on the Flints' two (2) acres, were awarded to them but the three (3) loafing sheds and
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panels located on Marlene Stone's remaining 15 acres located at 5990 South 7100 West, Hooper,
Utah, remained her property.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN SUSTAINING PLAINTIFF'S
OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S WITNESS'S TESTIMONY ON
GROUNDS OF HEARSAY AND RELEVANCE.

Counsel for the Flints called Jeffrey Dean Harris as a witness to testify concerning a
meeting he had with Marlene Stone to discuss possible purchase of two (2) acres and some
personal property to be included in the sale. Counsel for Marlene Stone objected to the
testimony of the witness when asked what did Marlene Stone state, "was the personal property
that was included with that purchase." (R at 133)
The trial court ruled it was clearly hearsay (R at 135) and requested counsel for the Flints
to point to an exception to the hearsay rule that would allow the testimony to come in. (R at 135)
Counsel for the Flints cited Rule 803(3), Utah Rules of Evidence, the existing mental state of
mind of the declarant, (Marlene Stone).
Counsel for Marlene Stone then objected on the grounds of relevance as the conversation
with the witness, Jeffrey Harris, occurred on a different day, different time, and it is not material
nor relevant to the Flints' case. The Court sustained that objection. (R at 136)
Testimony by the witness about what Marlene Stone may have said on a different
occasion and date is clearly hearsay and not relevant to the case between the Flints and Marlene
Stone. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible, pursuant to Rule 402, Utah Rules of
Evidence, and the testimony of the witness was clearly hearsay. Defendants, Flints' witness's
testimony was correctly excluded by the trial court.
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III.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN EXCLUDING AND ALLEGEDLY
MISSTATING SALIENT FACTS FROM ITS FINDINGS OF FACT

Counsel for the Flints argues that paragraphs 12 and 13 of the Findings of Fact refer only
to three (3) lounging/loading sheds, and some mobile gates and panels on Marlene Stone's
property being in dispute in the suit. The only possible reference to structures in Findings of Fact
13 was the last sentence that the parties had no further discussion regarding the structures as they
may lie inside and outside the two (2) acres.
The Flints argue it is important that they allegedly took possession of all the feeders,
waterers, and horse walker located on Marlene Stone's property and the Court failed to include
those facts in its Findings. However, the parties stipulated the only trial issues were ownership
of the lounging/loafing sheds and the non-fixed mobile panels. The parties stipulated, in their
Confidential General Release, those were the only two issues and that the horse walker was the
property of the Flints and included in the Bill of Sale. The location and ownership of the feeders
and waterers was irrelevant at the time of trial and was not contested by either party. The parties
and the trial court are bound by the agreement of the parties as to what issues were contested and
to be decided by the trial court.

CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF

The trial court's determination that the Real Estate Purchase Contract and the Bill of Sale
are not ambiguous should be affirmed. The trial court's interpretation that the loafing/lounging
sheds and mobile panels were not "presently attached" to the property purchased by the Flints nor
were these items of personal property, "now at 6006 South 7100 West, Hooper, Utah" at the time
17

the parties signed the REPC and Bill of Sale, should also be affirmed.
Plaintiff, Marlene Stone, should be awarded her attorney fees and costs on appeal,
pursuant to Clause 17 of the REPC and also Clause 17 of the Confidential General Release and
Settlement Agreement.

Respectfully submitted this

day of January, 2010.
NEELEY&NEELEY

ROBERT L.
Attorney for Plaintiff/AppeU^e

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
In accordance with Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 26(b), I hereby certify that on the
^j day of January, 2010 two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of the Appellee
were served by U.S. mail, postage prepaid, to David B. Stevenson, attorney for
Defendant/Appellant, at the following address:
David B. Stevenson
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C.
3986 Washington Blvd.
Ogden, Utah 84403

ETARY
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ADDENDUM
A

&

REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT

Tnte k A legsty Wntfloj) conduct Utah law require* r**J t s u t * lictMtti to u»* tt#* fomt, feuy#f cmift«|Uir,hQ**v«r( mar «0tv* to «Ksr or
d«4#t» it» provHtoo* or to u»« a dlftmmt ton*, it ycKJ dMint K*0iH Qr t»* mivtct, consort your attorn** or lax advisor.

EARNEST IION£Y RECEIPT
Buy©r_
rU
~ offers to purehaa© the Property
sdbefjy
described
bepow and hereby deliver*tothe Btrokeraae. a& Earnest Money, the amount of $
t^OV^
in the form
of.
which, upon Acceptance of this offer by all parties (as
AzAanckl
defined in Section 23). shall be deposited in accordanc© with statt low
S

Received by „

.

/Mfoy

on.

(Sign^lrift cf *omito(f*mi Ac*rv>d*dp«* wtwjxt of kwnG*t Moray)

Brokerage:.

Phone Mumber^

t. PROPERTY:
also descried
City of.
1.1 Included Item*. Unlea* excluded herein, thte sale include* the following ttents (f presently owned and attached to
the Property' plumbing, heating, air conditioningfixturesand equipment, coiling tens; water Neater, built-in appliances, light
fixtures and bufbs; bathroom fixtures; curtain*, draperies and rods; window and door screens; storm doors and windows;
window Wind*; awnings; infctarffed television antenna, satellite dtehes and system, permanently affixed carpets: automatic
garage door opener and accompanying transmitted$), fencing, and trees and shrubs The following Item* shall also be
inrtxkfCNnJh*
^ B ^ ^ f o w ^ *T
nciM<WNn th* wte apd
ocd conveyed ,undf
finderr separate^!
separate Bill of $ate with warranties as to title rf^W&wtikAN/
€
f

^ Hy
_,'

1*2 Excluded lt»m& The fdttowing items are excluded from \x\\% sale. Z

RlgJht*. The foljoyvwg water ngihjgjare included tnimisftftte.— C L ^ ./Jku, <*y

a^csu^jr^

tfff

PURCHASE PRICE, The Purchase Pnce forttte Property is $

p^$

*
COlthr

y iff* ^

$^2^2ffil

,
r.

fv®^__Z_

J4^ZZ

1A Method of PayjtWMtL The Purchase Price will b« paid as. fallows
(*) E&rnett Mon*y D*po»it Under certain conditfbns described in this Contract, THIS
DEPOSIT WAY BECOME TOTALLY NONREFUNDABLE.
|bj New Loan. Buyer apre^s to apply for a„new loan as provided in Section 2,3 Buyer will appty
for one or mom! of ttia fotowJng loans: J / f CONVENTIONAL [ } FHA [ ] VA
( ) QTHGR (specify)—
.. . .
^
If on FHAA/Ak>an applies, see attach&d FHAA/A Loan Addendum,
if ih* iqan h K> mciude any i
j / j SPECIFIC LOAN TERMS

$
$

tWtyQtBL

(c)
id)
(•)
(f)

Loan Assumption Acme
Addendum (S€*e attached Assumption Addendum^ applicable)
Sailer Financing (*e«Lgttach£d Selier Fmancino Add<>ndum if applicable)
Otlwr(»|Miclfy)
„J&Z.
.
Bctance of Purchae* f*ric# In Ca«ch at Settlement

PURCHASE; PRICE. Total of line* (*) through (f)

2.2 Financing Condition, (check applicable bo*)
^ ' J ^ 4 B u y e r i o ^ ' g 5 1 ^ to purchase the Property IS conditioned upon Buyer Qualifying for the applicable loan(a)
. ^ftrenced in Section 2.1(b) or (c) (the 'Loan"), This condition is referred to as the "Financing Condition."
(b) [ ] Bgy&r's obligation to purchase the Property IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer qualrfying for a ban Section
2.3 doas not apply.
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^i/W^

2.3 Application tor Loan,
|a) Buy«r%s duties. No lat*r than the Loan Application & Fee Deadline referenced In Section 24{a), Buyer shall
apply for the Loan, l o a n Application' occurs only when Buyer has- (i) completed, signed, and cteirvenad to the
ksnder (the Tender) the initial toan application 9nd documentation required by the Under; and til) paid all loan
application fees as required by the Lender. Buyer agreestodiligently work to obtain the Loan. Buyer will pramp%
provide the Lender wtth any addition^ documentation as required by the Lender.
(b) Procedure If Loan Application Is danfed. If Buyer receives written notice from the Lender that the Lander
doe* not approvt the Loan (a "Notice of Loan Denial"). Buyer shall, no later titan three calendar days thereafter,
provide a copy to Seller Buyer or Salter may, within three calsndar days after Seller* receipt of such notice,
cancel this Contract by providing written noticetothe other party. In the event of a cancellation under this Section
2.3(b): (1) K the Notice of Loan Denial was received by Buyer no later than the Loan Denial Deadline referenced in
Section 24(d), the Earnest Money Deposit shall be returned to Buyer, (ii) if the Notice of Loan Denial was received
Dy Buyer after that date, the Earnest Money Deposit shall be released to Seller, anti Seller agrees to accept as
Seller'* exclusiverafoedyH>e Samest Money Deposit as liquidated damage*. A failure to cancel as provided m this
Section 2.3(b) shaft have no effect on the Financing Condition set forth in Section 2.2(a)- Cancellation pursuant to
the provisions of any other section of this Contract shall be governed by such other provisions.
2.4 AppMlsa) Condition, Buyer's obligation to purchase the Property*^ 18 [ ) IS NOT conditioned upon the Property
appraeMnfl for not less than the Purchase Price, Thia condition is referred to as the "Appraisal Condition'. If the
Appraisal Condition applies and the Buyer receive wntt*n notice from the Lender that the Property hss appraised for
less than the Purchase Prloe (a "Notice of Appraised Vatue"), Buyer may canoe* this Contract by providing a copy of
sucfc written notice to Seller no ialer than threi* days after Buyer's receipt of such written notice. In the event of a
canceiiailon under thi$ Section 2,4: (I) If the Notice of Appraised Value was received by Buyer no later than the
Appraisal Deadline referenced in Section 24(e). the Earnest Money Deposit shall be returned to Buyer; {ii) If the Notice
of Appraised Value was received by Buyer after thai date, the Earnest Monty Deport shall ba released to Seller and
Seller agrees to accept as Salter's exclusive remedy, the Earnest Money Deposit a* liquidated damages. A failure to
cancel es provided in this Section 2.4 shall be deemed a waiver of the Apprateal Condition by Buyer. Cancellation
pursuanttothe provisions of any other section of this Contract shall be governed by such other provisions
3. S E m E M E N T AND CLOSING.
Settlement shall take place on the Settlement Deadline rafanonoad in Section 24(f), or on o date upon which Buyer And
Setter agree in writing. "Setdement* shall occur only when all of the following have been completed: (a) Buyer ^jnd Seller
have signed and delivered to each other or to the escrow/closing office all documents required by this Contract, by the
Lender, by written escrow instructions ar by applicable law; (b) any monies required to be paid by Buy*r under these
documents (except for the proceeds of any new loan) have been delivered by Buyer to Seller or to the escrow/dosing office
In the term of collected or cleared funds; and (c) any monies required to be paid by Seller under these documents have
bean delivered by Seller to Buyer or to the escrow/closing office in the farm of collected or cleared funds. Seller and Buyer
shall each pay one-half (?) of the fee charged by trie escrow/closing office for its services In the settlement/closing process.
Taxes and assessments for the current year, rents, and Interest on assumed obligations shall be prorated &t Settlement as
set forth in this Section. Tenant deposits {including, but not limited tot security deposits, cleaning deposits and prepaid
rents) £nali be paid or credited by Seller to Buyer at Settlement. Prorations, set forth in this Section shell be mads as or the
Settlement Deadline date referenced in Section 24(f), unless otherwise aareed bo in writ*>g by the parties. Such
wilting could include the settlement statement The transaction will be considered dosed when Settlem&nt has been
competed, end when nil of the following hastt been completed: (r) the proceeds of any new loan have been delivered by
the Lender to Seller or to the escrow/closing office; and (Ii) the applicable Closing document have been recorded in the
office of the county recorder. The actions described in parts (i) and (ii) of Ihe preceding sentence shall be completed
within four calendar days of SeiUement
4.

POSSESSION. 9fcfop shall d«liv«f physical odJW^esl<

_h0urs [ 1

^dsya att*ju£lofilftg;

Y
^"Whe^igning of this Contract;
I |#tW Seller's
sellers Initial
i n i t m w f c j L / ] B « y « m mtuawft& p t _^>

5. C<

The Listing Agent,
The Listing Broker,

/Jrffi^
si+L~
f?
^r 7 / r*&\t—j[jtf!MM/*^^

Tha Selling Agent f „ ~ ^ — ,
The Selling Broker, /&&Tp%?

P*g# 2 of 6 pages
6/&6 Rev 6A33

tt&JnyG$

Seller1* Initials^//Ij

>fr

t&yr'&cs

'

, represents | ^ i e H e r [ }4fc#y«r"f-+fre*n^^ and Seller
s
as * Limited Agent;
represents; |/J Seller [ J_Bu/e^[ ] both Buyer and Setter
1 s t Limited Agent;
, represents H ^ t t t a r y) Buyer [ H»eili Ouyei and Seller

<fe$L. represents H-S#Wer J^fBuyer [ I b r t i i Buyef^nd Seller

Buyer's Initials.

-tf

D*t2Lues'

6. T l i l E INSURANCE. At Settlement, Salter agnaes to pay for a standard-coverage owner's policy of title insurance
insuring Bayer in the amount of the Purchase Price Any a c t i o n a l tltfo insurance coverage ahall be at Buyer's expense
7. s e U E R DISCLOSURES. No later than the Seder Disclosure Deadline r*f«renc*d m Section 24(b), Sailer shall
provide to Buyer the fallowing documents which are collectively referred to as the "Seller Disclosures":
(A) a Seller property condition disclosure for the Property signed end doted by Seller,
(b) a commitment for the policy of title Insurance
( c | a copy of any leases affecting the Property not expiring prior to Closing;
(d) written notice of any claims emd/or conditions known to Seller relating to environmental problems and building or
zoning code violations, and
(«) Other (specify) _
«
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

8. BUYER'S RIGHT TO CANCEL BASED ON EVALUATIONS AND INSPECTIONS. Buyer's obligation to purchase
under this- Contract (cheek *ppfic»hto bo*©*)
(») y/\ 15 [ ] IS NOT conditioned upon Buyw's approval of the content of all the Seler Disclosures refcnenced in Section 7;
(bj [yj B [ J IS MOT cond(ttor>ed upon Buyers approval of a physical condftion inspection of the Property;
W T x ' f ® t 1 ^ ^ T conditioned upon Buyer1* approve! ot s survey of the Property by a licensed &urveyor ("Survey"};
W y^i®
t 1 1 8 WOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of th& cost., terms and availability of homeowner's insurance
,
covered tor ttiei Property N
(«*) y/\ 13 [ ] IS NOT condiboned upon Buyers approval of the foltawrng teste and evaluations of the Property (Specify)

If any of the above Items are checked In the affirmative, then Section* G 1, B 2, a.3 and 8,4 apply; otherwise, they do
not apply The items checked In this affirmative above are coltactivaiy referred to at the "Evaluations & Irtspections,* Unless
otherwise provided in this Contract, the Evaluations & inspection* shall be paid for by Buyer and shall PA conducted by
individuals or entities of Buyer's choice Seller agrees to cooperate with the Evaluations & Inspections and with the
walk-through inspection under Section 11,
8.1 Evaluation* & Inspections Deadline. No later than the Evaluations & Inspections Deadline referenced In
Section 24(c) Buyer shall- (a) complete all Evaluations & Inspections; md (b) determine if the Evaluations. & inspections
are acceptable to Buyer
8.2 Right to Cancel or Obfact if Buyer determines that the Evaluations & inspection* are unacceptable. Buyer may,
no later than the Evaluations & Inspections Deadline, either, (a) cancel this Contract by providing written notice to Seller,
whereupon the Earnest Money Deposit shall be released to Buyer' or (b) provide Seller with written notice of objections,
B.3 Faiturp to rUwtpond. If by the expiration of the Evaluations & Inspections Deadline, Buyer does not: (a) cancel
this Contract 3?- provided in Section 8.2; or (b) deliver a written objection to Sefisr regarding the Evaluations & Inspections,
the Evaluations & Inspections: shall be deemed approved by Buyer,
8,4 Response by Seller, If Buyef provides written objections to Seller, Buyer and Seller shall have sfcven calendar
days after Seller's receipt of Buyer's objections (the "Response Per^d") i n uybch to agree In writing upon the manner cf
resolving Buyer's objections Except as provided in Secton 10.2. Seller may, but shall not be required to, resolve Buyer's
objections. If Buyer and Seller have not agreed in writing upon the manner of resolving Buyer's objections, Buyer msy
cancel this Contract by providing written notice to Seller no later than three calendar days after expiration of the Response
Period; whereupon the Earnest Money Deposit shall be released to Buyer If this Contract is not canceled by Buyar under
this Secbon 8.4, Buyer's objaciions shad rwa deemed waived by Buyer This waiver shall not affect those items warranted
in Section 10.
3, ADDITIONAL TERMS, T h e r e J / J A RE t s^-Afe-ficnn&ddenda to this Contrac; containing additional terms, tt there
are, the term&jrf the following addend* are incorporated into this Contract by this r*ferwc&t p M t R U n d u m No.jfSb^L- ,
[~~f&ttterTffffi\c\nQ Addendum H T f HA/VA Ltran Addendum [H'^ff^'tnirthrn .ftrfrtffnffifm
f ~ | t W d - t t k * * d Paint Dlacloaure & Acknowledgement (In aome transaction this disclosure I* required by law)
P-ft#S , 53ia*Btf PaintjMdendpp? (in from* tranaactions t h ^ addendum itfreguirfrd br taw?

pother[*t>*c\fv)^Csyfr7?^jre ^y
Page 3 of 6 pages
WW Rev 8/03

Salter's Initials

&2i^£zfl£^^h

-^T^^
P

Buyer's Initials

^ ^ £ :
4U.~

Date

1fJ. SELLEtt WARRANTIES t REPRESENTATIONS.
1 G~t Condition of TJtte. Seller represents that Seller has tee title to tne Property and win convey good and marketable
title to Buyer it Closing by general warranty deed Buyer agrees, however, to accept title to the Property subject to the
following matters of record: easements, deed restrictions, CC&R's (meaning covenants, conditions and restrictions), and
rights-of-way; end subject to the content* of the Commitment for Title Insurance as agreed to by Buys'- under Section 6,
Buyer also agrees to take the Properly subject to existing lease5 affecting the Property and not expiring prior to Closing,
Buyer agrees to be responsible for taxes, assessments, homeowners association due*, utilities, and other service*
provided to the Property after Closing Except for any lo*tn(&) specifically assumed by Buyer under Section 2.1(c), Sailer
w&i cause to be paid off by Closing all mortgages, trufcl deed*, judgments, mechanic's liens, tax itene and warrants Seller
will cause to be paid current by Closing all aesessmente and homeowners association dues.
10,2 Condition of Property, Seller warrants that the Property will be in the following condition ON THE DATE
SELLER DELIVER* PHYSICAL POSSESSION TO BUYER:
(a> the Property shall b& broom-clean and free of debris and pon&onal belongings Any Seller or tenant movingrelated damage to the Property shall be repaired nt Sutler's exp*n*«;
(b) the heating, pooling, electrical, plumbing and sprinkler systems and fixtures, and the appliances endfireplaceswill
bs in *?orkbg order and fit for their intended purposes;
\c) the roof &f\d foundation thai) be free of teaks known to Seller;
(<J| erry private well or eeptic tank serving the Property shall have applicable permits, and shall be in working t>raet
and fit tor Its Intended purpose; and
(•) the Property end improvements, including tne landscaping, will be in the $ame general condition ais they were on
the? date of Acceptance.
H U Home VMarranty Plan. The "home Warranty Plan" referenced In this Section 10.3 is separate from the warranties
provided by Seller under Sections 10.1 and 10*2 above. {Checfc applicable box©*): A one-year Horn* V&rranty Plan
p d W l L L i | WILL NOT be included in this transaction if incfudad. the Home Warranty Plan shall be ordered by [Xbuyor
[ ) 8»U*r andshallbe issued by a company selected by p f Buyer [;--lJ»eMei^The co&t of the Home Warranty Plan shall
not exceed S !5JS7*L and small ba paid for at SaltJemantoy [ i j Qoyar ]A Seller
11, WALK-THROUGH INSPECTION. Before Settlement, Buyer may, upon reasonable notice and at a reasonable time,
conduct a "wnlMhrougrT inspection of the Property to determine only that the Property is "as represented," meaning that
the items referenced in Sections 1.1, 8.4 and 10.2 ("the item$*) are respectively present, repairedfchanged as agreed, and
in the warranted condition. If the items are not as represented, Seller will, prior to Settlement, replace, correct or repair
the item*-or, with the consent of Buyer (and Lender if applicable), escrow an amount at Settlement to provide for the same.
The failure to conduct a walk-through inspection, or to claim that an item Is not as represented, *hall not constitute a
waiver by Buyer of the nght to receive, on the date of possession, the items as represented,
12, CHANGES DURING TRANSACTION. Seller agrees, that from the date of Acceptance until the date of Closing, none
of the following shall occur without the prior written concent of Buyer, (a) no changes in any existing leases snail be mtxlz\
(b) no new leases shaft be entered Into; (c) no substantial alterations or improvements to the Property eherft be made or
undertaken; and (d) no further financial encumbrances to the Property shall be made.
13, AUTHORITY OP SIGNERS, If Buyer or Seller is a corporation, partnership, trust estate, limited liability company, or
other entity, the person executing thw Contract on its behalf warrants his or her authority 10 do so and to bind Buyer and
Seller.
14, COMPLETE CONTRACT. This Contract together With Its addenda, any attached exhibits, and Seller Disclosures,
constitutes the entire Contract between the parties and supersedes and replaces any and all prior negotiations,
representations, warranties, understandings or contracts between the parties. This Contract cannot be changed except by
written agreement of the parties.
15, OlSPtlT€ RESOLUTIONS The parties BQfQe that any dispute, arising prior to or after Closing, related to th& Contract
check applicable box)

J SHALL
t*3 MAY AT THE OPTION OF THE PARTIES
first be submitted to mediation, if the parties agree to mediation, the dispute: shall be submitted to mediation through
a mediation provider mutually agreed upon by the parties. Each party agrees to bear its own costs of mediation. If
mediation tell*, the other procedures &n4 remedies available under this Contract shall apply. Nothing in tnis Section 15
shall prohibit any parry from seeking emergency equitable relief pending mediation.
4

Page 4 of 6 pages
(5^9$ &«v eVQS

Seller's Initials Jj/jfjjl
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Pate(JjL.l//rjjJP

Buyer* Initiate_

if
4^/

DateJ^/lc^r

16 DEFAULT If Buyer defaults, Setter may elect either to retain the Earnest Money Deposit a& liquidated damages, or
to return »t and sue Buyer to specifically enforce this Contract or pursue other r&medies available at law If Seller dafautts,
u> addition to return of the Earnest Money Deposit, Buyer mvy elect either to accopt from Seller a sum equal to the
Earnest Money Deposit as liquidated damages, or may sue Seller to specifically enforce this Contract or pursue other
remedies available at law H Buyer etocts to accept liquidated damages Seller screes to psy the liquidated damages to
Buyer upon demand It is agreed that denial ofa Loan Application made by the Buyer is not a default and is governed by
Section 2 3(b)
17. ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS, In the event of litigation or binding arbitration to enforce this Contract, the
prevailing party thall be entitled to costs and reasonable attorney fees However attorney fees snail not be awarded for
participation in mediation under Section 15
1ft NOTICES, Except Us provided in Section 23, all nottoes required under this Contract must be (a) in writing, (b) signed
by the party giving notice, and (c) received by the other party or th& other party's agent no later than the applicable date
referenced in tlire Contract
19 ABROGATION. Except for the provisions of Sections 10 1, 10J2, 15 and 17 and express warranties made in this
Contract, th© provisions of this Contract shall not apply after Closing
20, RISK OF LOSS. All risk of loss to the Property, including physical damage or destruction to the Property or its
Improvements- due to any cause except ordinary wear and tear and loss caused t>^ a taking In eminent domain, shaft be
borne by Seller until the transaction re closed
21, TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE. Time la of the essence regarding the date? «et forth m this Contract Extensions must
be agreed to in wntmg by all parties. Unless otherwise expficiUy stated in this Contact <a) performance under aach
Section of this Contract which references a dste shall absolutely be required by 5;00 PM Mountain Time on the stated date,
and (b) the term 'days' shall mean calendar days and shall be counted beginning on the day following the event which
triggers the timing requirement (i e„ Acceptance Notice of Loan Denial, etc ) Performance dates end times referenced
herein shall not be binding upon Utie companies, lenders, appraiser* and others not parties to 1hi& Contract except as
otherwiiff agreed to m writing by such non-party
22, FAX TRANSMISSION AND COUNTERPARTS. Facsimile (fax) transmission of a signed copy of this Contract, any
addenda and counteroffers, and the retransmission of any signed fa* shall be the same a$ delivery of an original This
Contract and any addenda and counteroffers may be executed in counterparts
23, ACCEPTANCE, -Acceptance" occurs when Seller or Buyer, responding to an offer or counteroffer of the other
(a) «gas th* offer or counteroffer u/t\*ca noted to indicate acceptance, and (b) communicates to the other party or to the
oth*r party's agent that the offer or counteroffer has bean signed a$ required
24 CONTRACT DEADLINES, fcuyer and Seller agree that the following deadlines shall apply to this Contract.
(a) Lpan Application & free Deadline
(b) Setter Disclosure Deadlint
(c) Evaluations & Inspections- Deadline

a/fl/efr-.
£//<?/£ SL
j g / a zfes-'

/fa*.

(d> Loan ttani*! Deadtin*

/ 2^2? <T"

(c) Apprabi*! QMriline
(f) Settlement Deadline* £ J 7 \

P a g * £ of $ ptgtre
W96 f»«iv 8JD3

. (Date)
. (Date)
(Datej
. (Date)
(Date)

grf~

Sailer's Initials

Jill

(Date)

P n t e d S L L & L - f t S f Buy»r>* Initial*

pJ

nttJU/l[OS

)

25. OFFER AND TIME FOR A C C E P T A N C E . Buyer otters 10 purchase "th* Property on t t e abdh/* terms and conditions.
ipSellef does not accept this ofter by:
^ : * Q
[ ] A M {7 Pty Mountain Ttme on J->{ / J ? " / P A ^ D a t e V this offer
/ s h a l l lapse, and 1f>o Brokerage shall return the Earnest htol&v Ueppait to Buysr.
' 7

[%W't

S^nahirt)

(Oftt
fttvDijU}

/

{ft^tf'5^

3ff«r D « t t * * h i i H 5 i ft»*
Tht lit#r Of thw ptoOVT! Off*r

(fluytn' Nrww)

if.

(PLEASE PRMT)

fO**r

; WjJOfTar ftflWrtwrc* Date"

(Motet Addr*ti|

Wp Coot)

<PftcrH)

ACCEPTANCBCOyHTEROFFEfWEJECnON
,CHE£K ONE:
^ f H ACCEPTANCE OF OFFER TO PURCHASE:
^
specified above.

Skslter Accepts the foregoing otter on the terms and conditions

y#[ >yCOUWTEfiePPWt: Sallsr pmwmts tor Buyer's- Acceptance the tenm$ of Buyer's ofter subject to the exceptions or
modifications a$
a* apGcifitrc
*p*cifitrcJ w the attached ADDENDUM N O . _
„

<^£

_j25Lii2AisLy*
(Dtrt*)
(No4»c+ A o d / t w )

<Pft<*>»t

(Zlfc Cod»)

( J RE*JECHQK: Seller Rejects the foregoing offer.
(&«tar t Bi$n*ur#>

<D*Wrt

(Time)

( S c a r ' s &g<ru»H4r<i)

(Dfttft)

(Twm)

*••*<*•**«*•* frirW** A¥r*t-**r*4HNHt4iw»t * * * * * * * * * * . * * * + 4 . * # * f r * * * ^ - i » * - l < + 4 * «

DOCUMENT RECEIPT

/

J & f te law requires Bnoker to furnish Ekiyer and Sefle£_w?th copies ofjhis Contract bearing aft signatures ( R l in applicable
section balow,}
AyH> acknowledge receipt of Afinal copy of the foregoing Captr;
(filoyw'i $ * f r t * M * )

CC*1«)

(Salter4* fti^nsiurc)

(D«*)

(Etett^e SljrfNtlure}

B. 1 personally caused s final copy of the foregoing Contract beating all signatures to be ( J faxad [
tielivared on
(Date), postage prepaid, to the I I Seller [ J B u y a r

(omu)

] mailed { ] hand

StflX/D&Wwnti by (specify).

THIS FORM APPROVES W TMC UTAH REAL MTATC COMMISSION AND THE OPPfCE OF I t f E l i J A H H W ' r e f H * ^ ^
EFFECTIVE AUGUSTf *, 2£>0X \T REPLACES AMD SUPERSEDES A L L PREVIOUSLY APpROYfcP v£RJ*tQ>H& OP THIS r o S f e r ^
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ADDENDUM NO.
TO
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT

THIS IS AN/^J ADDENDUM j ] COUNTEjgpfFBR tolhat. REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT (the *REPC*) with
G
an Offer W r e n c e Qat» <£ - *
Including all prior addenda and counteroffers,
n j Jrt[[] <f
M » w n XJfcJ^Swfpf T V . f f t y p t t * Q
as Buyer, and
/ ^ f ^ ^ e ^ ^ . £ rrr*-£~
•
«$ Stiller,
regard ins the Property located a t ,
j f o / f f / j ^ J>4^
*^¥&fcUbj/~
The
ti*fclZ3tf7-C<4^,
toRowtng terms are hereby Incorporated « part w trie RE PC:
'
^

SzfAr-h

Ax i*° />ftH0+.dy

&/A*rv.J*~rt

£tsur^w~<-ct

&»f£«<Lr-/nt.
—JTZj^/6^
T£SU. /^rcysLr rc/fr

^Affirm/•#-/
i>v £i>£{crJ

' '" — - — — -•

>f {yh&U^

terriers

S&/,£

,

r*L&uS****/

^ t*° < / W J W
'

— " —

*

f/rtF^nJ

-

i

i-ffni

n 11 i i ii

ihfksiA
'
'

•——in

BUYER AND S E L L E R A G R E E THAT T H E C O N T R A C T DEADLINES REFERENCED I N S E C T I O N 24 O F THE R B R C
(CHECK APPLICABLE BOX): { J REMAIN U N C H A N G E D

[ ] ARE CHANGED A 3 FOLLOWS:

To the extent tha term* of this ADDENDUM modify or conflict with any provisions of the R E P C , Including nil pntor addandA^ind counteroffers, the&e terms shall conlrot, A * other termsoj^he REPC, including alt prior addenda and counteroffers.
riot modified by this A D D E N D U M aha* remain the saim. [ J w w > r [ ] Buyer shall bav& unfit
[ ) AW [ J f*W
/
Mountain Time on „,
{Dateh to receipt t h * terms of tms A D D E N D U M in aocord»noe wKh the provisions of Section
23 ofjlj* R i p a qntess so ^qaptetf, the offer as set forth ifi this ADPfcNDUM *tm\Uhpm.
/7
,

ACCEPTANCE/COUNTEllDFFiRmEJECTlON
CHECK ONE:
A C C E P T A N C E : [ J Seller [ } Buyer her&by accepts m e terms of thte A D D E N D U M .
[

J C O U N T E R O F F E R [ J Seller [ J Buyer ppra&e
r e s e t s a * a counteroffer the terms of attached ADDENDUM NO..

(Si^Kwm;
[

torn;

(nni#j

(8k*mui*}

^ ^

^ j

1 R E J E C T I O N : [ J Seller [ 1 Buyer rejects thfc foregoing ADDENDUM.

tHlS F O W APPROVED 6Y THE UTAH KtAL esTATC COWWH^SION AND THB1 OFFICE OF THC UTAH AnOHNBY GENERAL
^FfntCTlVE Auousr c. 200^, I T REPUACES A N D 6UPe^s£oes A L L PREVIQUSLT A P P R O V E D VERSIOMS O F T H B F O R M

*™«

^

6*94 R « t f/CO

UARF

°nn 2
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ADDENDUM NO.

/

of

<_^

/~k.2ZL

REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT

»©•fwu»*wtrv
K

THfS 16 AH y\ ADDENDUM [ ] CCUNTEROPP ER totoat REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT {Ihe "REPC") wrtn
an i M f r feaference Date ©f _ ^
£ ? / / JO&
Including afi oripr addends ^ o counteroffers, between
r ^ r ^ f o - ^ t f , W ) r ^fcUu&L
:as>Lyer, and
/ ^ * ^ f e j i* J> feW •
as Seliar
regarding the Prooerty located at
Qr^)
(aSrt
^7 fflTTu J
y ^ ^ f l ^ ,
Th*
following terms are horaby incorporated ae part ol the REPC
X
1. OPTION TO KEEP HOUSE ON MARKET ("TIME CLAUSE")
11 Rlflht to Accept Other Offers. Buyer and SoU«r agrae that Sailor may continue to offw the Proparty for sale end
to accepl other offers subject to th* rights of Btryfcf i& provided below, K Seller accepts any euch offers, Salter will notify
Buyar in writing within
CJ*^'
{[) calendar day* After £n^u>n into such a contract
1,2 Right to Remove Condition*, Buryi&r ahaH have
< f\_.
(Xhours after receipt of Sellers written notice in
which to either: (a) agree in writing to remove from the REPC tr>e following condilion(e) (check applicable fcoxac):
yf Financing Condition; ^fTvppraisal Condition; {/fEvaluations & Inspections., j / j f Subject to the Sate of Buyers
Keuidence: [ ) Other (explain)
_ ™ ^
m
or (r>) by tawing to respond In writing to Sellers notice, allow the REPC to automatically become canceled, in whlcn
instance, the Earnest Money Deposit shall be released to Buyer.
BUYER AND SELLER AGREE THAT THE CONTRACT DEADUNES REFERENCED IN SECTION 24 OF THE REPC
(CHECK APPLICABLE BOX)' [ J REMAIN UNCHANGED [ ] ARE CHANGED AM FOLLOWd:

To the extent the term* pf this ADDENDUM modrfy or conflict with any provisions of the REPC, (including all prior addenda
and counteroffers, these tormc shall control All other terrm oTjhe REPC, including all prior addMda^pd counteroffers,
not modified by this AODENDUy shall* remain the x&me. J^Sellcr [ J Buyer shall have until 1*5;
[ J AM V) PM
Mountain Time on
/Z/p/^.
(Date), to accept the term* of thte ADDENQUM In accordant wrth
t3
}he provision* of Section 23p^the^EPC, Untoa* so accapted^hey^f efi^et forth in#>te ADDENiawM shall lapse.
Buyer [ ) Seller Signature

(Date)

(time)

JLfJBuy^i ISpterSljjhaiure

(Date)

(Tima)

ACCEfnA^E/cau»flra^
. fECKONE;
^
[ACCEPTANCE:: { ] SMiar [ J Buyer hereby accept* Ota terms of this ADDENDUM.
( ] COUNTEROFFER; [ 1 Seller [ J Bayer presents as a counteroffer Ihe terms of attached ADDENDUM NOs _,
(Signature)

(Date)

(Time)

(Signature)

(Data)

(Tims*

I ] REJECTION- [ ] Seller [ 1 Buyer reject* tha foregoing ADDENDUM

(Signature)

(Dat*)

(Time)

(Senator*)

(Dal»)~

"" (Time)

THIS FORK AfPKOVEO BY THE UTAH RCAL B8TATE COHMW«HDN AND THE OFFICE OF THE iTTAH ATTORNEY G6NERAL.
eFPECTlVE AUGUST 5, W»3, FT R6PtJ*Ce* AND SUP*R&E0EB A l t P&eviOUacY APPROVE!* VERSIONS OF THIS TOrt*.
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ADDENDUM NO.
TO
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT

tSt

THl£$AN [ ADDENDUM [ ) C O U N T E R O F F E R S Ural REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT (the "REPC") with
an jarfer/Refelpence Date
counteroffers,
between
Includingg allprtoraddend,
allprtor
coun
nor addenda^fVi co
__^_ as Seller.
The

>2L
regarding the Property located at
&r£tt>
following terms are hereby incorporated as pan of the REPC:
t. SUBJECT TO SALE OF BUYER'S RESIDENCE
closing of th* sale of Buyer's residence located at:
, ^s^x 7 £
(the "Rft5rfdence") by 5:00 P.M, (MST) on the
/ jjtday a
"Residence closing Deadline*),

upon the

2^£

.(the

1.2 Strttt*. Buyer [ ) DOES [ V b O E S HOT have a signed contract for tho sste of tte Residence, The Residence
I ] * s Cr 5 N C * T P r * s * n uy liBtecffaf sale through (provide name/add re$&/phone of real estate brokerage): AtiSir
RflflltOflr/ P.O. BQX 271 / ^ 0 1 - 3 9 0 - 1 1 f t B If the Residence Isjnet now listed,rtwill be so listed on or before tho
%
. doy of
J^^JrJ^u^rZ
.J^fVSSZBuyer win diligently' |pursue the ciowng of the salt*
of the Residence.
1.3 Right to Cancel. If the sale of the Residence is not closed by the Residence Closing Deadline, Buyer or Seller
may, within threw calendar days after the Residence Closing Deadline, cancel the REPC by prwMng wrftten notioe ioth#
other parry In the event of such cancellation, (he Earnest Money Deposit shall beretaasedto Buyer. Buyer niay howfcverr,
remove this condition at any time prior to the Residence Closing Decline by providinp, written notice to Seller,
BUYSR AND SELLER AQREE THAT THE CONTRACT DEADLINES REFERENCED IN SECTION 24 OF THE REPC
(CHECK APPLICABLE BOX): [ } REMAIN UNCHANGED [ ) ARE CHANGED AS FOLLOWS:
^

To the extent the terms of this ADDENDUM modify or conflict with any provisions of the REPC, including all prior addenda
and counteroffers, these terms ehail control. All other tenra>&f the REPC. including all pfk* addeag^jSLod counteroffer*,
not modified by this ADDENDUM &hM najpain the earn*, Jkl S*U*r [ } Buyer shall havo until .f$\
[ ] Mk JWPM
jntaln Time on
ffi
/^k Jo£;
(Date), to acpapt the terms of trws ADDENDUM in accordance with
i9tom3 of Section 23/ifJhe^EPC. Unless so acc^Rted, V^<$S%TS$P$*\ forth trvffi)& ADDENDUM shall lapse.
ruyarl ] Sailer Signature

2It for

(Date) fnfme.)

(Date) TTrfne

ACCEPTANCE/COUNT
noN
\ nrjFfECK QUt\
( ^ > ^ I A p C E P T A N C E : [ 1 Sutler \ J Buyer hereby accepts the t&rms of this ADDENDUM.
£4^****'^
(Signature)

Wi<

[ ] B*tl*r [ ] &uy*r presents «s a counteroffer the twms of attached ADDENDUM NO.
(Date)

(Time)

(Signature)

(Date)

(Time)

(Onto)

(Time)

[ J REJECTION: [ 1 Seller [ ] Buy«r rejects tho foregoing ADDENDUM.
(Stgnatur*)

(Date)

(Time)

(Signature)

THta FORM APFROVE& *Y THE UTAH R*AL GflTATC C0M1W*$1CW AND THE OFFICE OF THE UTAH ATTORMEr GENERAL,
O^FCCTITVe AUCU8T 5. 20*3. IT REPLACES AND SUP!=ft8eOES ALL PREVIOUSLY APPROVED VERNON* OF THIS FORK.
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ADDENDUM NO. 4
TO
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT

THIS IS AN |X] ADOEMDUM [ ] COUNTEROFFER to that REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT (the "REPC") with
an Offer Reference Date of February 1 . 2DQft Including all prior addenda and counteroffers between Flint a* Buyer,
andSlDM a» Seller, regarding the Property located at 60D6 S . 7100 W. Hooper. Utah 84315. ThefollowJnpterms
nr<£ heraby incorporated as part of the REPC:
I L J h e Confirmation of aoflncv disclosure referenced in section 5 of the R.F.P.C shall be charged

as f&liowfi; Thft 1fetingagent shall be Mito Bgwman and the listing broKer shall bp Realty UnK, LI Q

ttrihc bothrepresentthf? seller. The Selling aqentand selling broker whp represents the buyer shall

AiiamJmmi tPremainthe same,
BUYER AND SELLER AGREE THAT THE CONTRACT DEADLINES REFERENCED IN SECTION 24 OF THE REPC
(CHECK APPLICABLE BOX): [X] REMAIN UNCHANGED [ } AR£ CHANQCD AS FOLLOWS:
To the extent the terms of this ADDENDUM modify or conflict with any provisions of the REPC, including all prior addenda
itrtd counteroffer*,these terms shad control. AH other terms of the REPC. including all pnor addenda and counteroffers,
not rnodlfied by this ADDENDUM shall remain the same. [ ] Seller [XI Buyer shall have until 5:QQ[ U AM [X] PM
Mountain Time on February B. 2QQB (Date), to accept tl>e terms of this ADDENDUM in accordance with the provision*
of Section 23 of the REPC. Unlaw so acoepted, the offer as set form In thte ADDENDUM shall lapse.
[ ) Buyer [ £f Seller Signature

(Data)

(Timer)

t ] Buyer [ ] Salter Signature

(Date)

(Time)

ACCEPTANCE/COUNT6ROFFEFt/REJSCTION

CHpCK ONE:
/
/MACCEPTANCE: I 1 S e , l e r V\ Bl*Y*r h e f Q °y
/ / j ^ C ^

ftCce

P

terms of this ADDENDUM

Ljw&allar^ ] Buyar presents es A cobrttetolterthe ternwof adtaqhed J

:NDUM NO.

P^f^/^%
(Signature)

(Date)

(Time)

(Time)

1-J REJECTION: [ ) Sailer [ ] Buyer rejects the foregoii
(Signature)

(Date)

(T>ne)

(Signature)

(Date)

(Time)

THIS FORM APPROVED BYTHi UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISStQfl ANP TH£ OFFICE Of THE UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
EFFECTIVE AUGUST J,2003, IT RcPLACM AND SUPERCEDES ALL PREVIOUSLY APPROVED VERSIONS OF THIS FOfW,

\
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Addendum No. 4 to REPC

ADDENDUM N O . J ^ L ^ ; 5 ^ ^

UJ

LEuf

REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT
THIS IS AH Y\ ADDENDUM [ ] COUNTEROFFER to that REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT (the *REPC") with
an Offer Reference Date of „
includingi aril ..Prior addends and counteroffers,
between
J^?r*v~r~
as Buyer, and
S /tfWjf^
, „
as Seller,
regarding the Property located at
.
—
The
followingfcermgare hereby incarporat&d as part of the REPG;

BUYER AMD SELLER AGREE THAT THE CONTRACT DEADLINES REFERENCED IN SECTION 24 OF THE REPC
(CHECK APPLICABLE SOX): [ J REMAIN UNCHANGED [ I ARE CHANGED AS FOLLOWS:

«

To the extent the terms of this ADDENDUM modify or conflict wtth any provlstons of the R6PC, including *fi prior adderv
da and counteroffers, these terms shall control. AB othertermsof the REPC, including all prior addenda and counteroffers.
not modified by this ADDENDUM shall remain the sanre, J ] Selk*$ ] Buyar shall have until
f 1 AW [ \PU
jnfcain Time on
(Date), to accept the terms of this ADDENDUM In accordance with the provisions of Section
,of toe REPCX Unless
spceptfd, me
the oner
offer asas. set
set rorm
forth mm\s
n\M$ Af^ptNuuw
ADDENDUM smtimtte.
SKSWJ '
jniess so
so apcf^iwa,
s/
/
[/(Buyer [ J Setter Sljnrture
tore

Dit*

/

T W

I J»«iy«r MJteflSr'feiflWilf*

D*»

llmt

ACCEPTA NC^CQUKTEROFTSg/REJECTiON
CHECK ONE
t K'J ACCEPTANCE: [ ] &t»«r [ ] Buyvr hereby accepts ttietemns of this ADDENDUM.
[

] COUNTEROFFER: I ]S»lw [ ] Buyer presents as a counteroffer thetermsof attached ADDENDUM NO..
(Dtt«}

(Sijpflttxift)

[

]

(Time)

(5ipn*ton?)

<Datt)

frjmo)

(Dat*}

rnma;

REJECTION! [ ] Sailer { J Buy«r rejects the foregoing ADDENDUM.

(Si^mture)

(Date)

(TtoDe}

(Sipnaiun*}

THIS PORW APPROVED B r THE UTAH REAL ESTATE COMfWSWM AMD THE OFFICE OF THE UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
EFFECTIVE AUGUST S, 2001. IT REPLACES AND SUPERSEDES ALL PREVIOUSLY APPROVED VERSIONS OF THIS FOR*.

UAR Form 2
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ADDENDUM
B

"THIS IS A LEGALLY BINDING CONTRACT IF NOT UNDERSTOOD, SEEK COMPETENT ADVICE."

Bill of Sale
(WITH WARRANTIES)

Know all Men by These Presents:
That Craig D. Stone and Marlene K. Stone as Trustees of The Stone Family Revocable Trust U/A
dated February 1, 2007 the SELLER, for and in consideration of the sum of: Ten Dollars and Other
Valuable Considerations to _jne/us_ in hand paid by Richard Flint and Judy Flint, the BUYER, the
receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, have/has
presents do/does

bargained, sold, assigned and transferred, and by these

bargain, sell, assign and transfer unto said BUYER that certain personal property now at

6006 S. 7100 W., Hooper, UT. 84315

WEBER County, State of UT, particularly described as follows:

Oven/Range, Refrigerator, Window Covering, 2 Water Irrigation Shares, All Lounging and Loafing
Sheds, Panels, Gates Feeders, Waterers, and Horse Walker as presently exist
And the Seller upon the consideration recited above warrants ownership of and good title to said property,
the right to sell the same and that there are no liens, encumbrances or charges thereon or against the same
and to defend the title and possession transferred to the BUYER against all lawful claims.
In Witness Whereof, I/We have hereunto set My/Our hand(s) this 16th day of April, 2008

mxn^^ri/i (l fa^

Marlene K. Stone (Trustee)

ADDENDUM
C
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Confidential General Release and Settlement Agreement
KECITALS
This action was commenced In the Second Judicial District Coun of Weber
County, State of Utah, by Plaintiff, Marfeen Stone, in which she sought eviction of
Defendants ana Counter Plaintiffs, Richard and Judy Film, fromteasedproperty
pursuant to claims of waste. The Defendants responded to this allegation and brought
counter claims against the Plaintiff on three grounds:
1,
2,
3,

Trespass
Breach of Contract and/or Conversion
Breach of the Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment (i.e., property warranty)

Pursuant to the following Settlement Agreement, STONE expressly agrees to
drop her lawsuit against FLINT and FLINT agrees to drop the First Cause of Action,
Trespass, from the suit, These items will be dismissed with prejudice within seven (7)
days of signing this agreement The parties herein stipulate that the only remaining
issues for the court are whether three (3) sheds and several non-fixed mobile panels on
STONE'S property are part of a Bid of Sale and Real Estate Purchase Contracts both
dated 16 April 2008.
This Confidential General Release and Settlement Agreement shall
hereinafter be referred to as the "Agreement,"
1.
RICHARD AND JUDY FLINT (FLINT), their heirs, successors,
administrators, agents and representatives, shall hereinafter be referred to, jointly and
individually, separately and collectiveiy, as FLINT,
2.
MARLENE STONE her partners, parenis, subsidiaries, divisions,
branches, and affiliates <the foregoing shall be collectively refenred to as STONE), and
each of their incorporators, directors, officers, owners, shareholders, servants, agents,
employees, former employees, attorneys and representatives, and the successors,
heirs and assigns of each of theforegoing,and any person, partnership, corporation,
association, organization or entity now or previously acting, directly, in the Interest of or
on behalf of MARLENE STONE shall hereinafter be referred to, jointly and individually,
separately and collectively, as STONE.
ASBEEMENE
3.
The parties hereby agree to stipulate that the legal ownership of the sheds
and non-fixed mobile panels are the sole and remaining issues which are scheduled for
a trial on 15 April 2009.

. uH.uvcrciiouii « anatn

*
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4.
On 1 January 2009, the parties agree that FLINT removed aff animals,
belongings, materials, farm equipment and any other personal property belonging to
FLINT from off of the property of STONE, which is the subject of a lease dated 16 April
2008 (15 acres adjoining and on the North and East of the FLINT property).
5.
It is expressly acknowledged that while the duration of, said lease was
from 17 April 2008 to 17 April 2009, the leaae expired per agreement of the parties
effective on 2 January 2009,
6.
STONE herein agrees to pay FLINT the sum of $559.00 for the prorated
remainder of the lease (S5S9 - $1,889,25/yr + 365 days/yr x 108 days remaining for
leaae period) within seven (7) days of the signing of this Agreement by the parties. This
number will be further reduced by an amount of $40 per month for each month that the
horse walker remains on STONE'S property. The parties agree that $80 of the above */
sum will be withheld from the $559 payment listed above to ensure such $40 per month
payment for a period of two months.
7.
The parties hereby agree not to disparage one another, specifically
including statements about the other to neighbors* friends, or church members erf the
FLINTS; further, the partes mutually agree to keep the terms and conditions of this
agreement confidential, subject to the exceptions in numbered paragraph 23 below.
8.
STONE hereby acknowledges and agrees to the terms and conditions of
the Joint Motion far Stipulated Temporary Injunction (i.e. three years, or until STONE
sells her property* which ever Is longer) and the proposed Order submitted to the court
that is attached hereto,
9.
It Is hereby acknowledged that there Is a horse walker that is located on
the STONE'S real property but which is the property of FLINT pursuant to a 16 April
2008 Real Estate Purchase Contract and accompanying Bill of Sale of the same date.
This statement is in no way an admission concerning the rightful ownership of the
loafing sheds or any remaining property on the STONE'S land and which the FLINTS
claim an interest in by virtue of said contracts.
10.
FLINT agrees to remove said horse walker by 30 January 2009- FLINTS
also agrees to cap the electrical line to the pasture electrical fence also by said date
and STONE agrees to cap and/or sever any connections from her electric fence that go
onto the FLINTS' property by said date,
11.
It is expressly agreed that STONE shall have no nght to any utilities
presently existing on her property but lhat are attached and/or coming from the FLINT
property. This Includes, but is not limited to, any electrical, water or sewer. It is
expressly agreed that the electrical lines for the horse walker will remain underground,
As part of the deconstmetion and/or movement Qf the horse walker, FLINT herein
agrees to cap the exposed electrical lines and bury them underground where they

aurdUttffl64

*
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currently exist. Furthermore, FLINT agrees to disconnect the eiectncal line to the horse
walker, at the point it comes above ground on FLINT'S property.
12.
To the extent there are other issues to work out between the parties
regarding the ownership or right to use utilities, including but not limited to gas,
siectrlcal, Irrigation or potable water lines on either party's property, this Agreement
does not address such Issues which are not currently before the court.
13.
The parties hereby expressly agree to comply with the requirements of the
court with respect to contact with one other.
14.
parlies.

This Agreement constitutes a partial settlement of the claims between the

15V
The parties acknowledge thai their properties adjoin each other and that
for significant sections of the property line there is no fence, or there are fences or other
structures traversing through the mutual property line. As a nesull, the parties recognize
that there will be continued need in the future to resolve disputes either between these
parties or their successors in interest.
16.
This Agreement in no way affects the property rights of the parties with
respect to either real property or personal property not at issue in this current lawsuit.
This includes, but Is not limited to, FLINTS' interest in two or more shares of irrigation of
the Wilson Hooper Water line purchased by the FUNTS from STONE. However, it Is
the intent of the parties to work together through their respective counsel to resolve any
future disputes concerning the common property lines and the structures that may be in
common as well.
17.
Each party will bear their own attorney's fees and costs for all matters
settled herein. The parties expressly reserve the right to request the fees and costs for
litigation for the remaining Issue concerning the ownership interest of the loafing sheds.
18.
This release Is purposefully broad* and it is Intended to capture any
conceivable claim which the parties have against each other or their agar.ts excluding
these specifically preserved herein.
19.
The parties warrant and represent that they have not sold, assigned,
granted, or transferred to any other person, corporate or natural, any claims
encompassed by this Agreement that he has, had, or may have at any time in the
future, or claims to have or have had against the other party.
20.
All negotiations relating to this Agreement are merged herein* There are
no promises, agreements, conditions, undertakings, warranties, or representations, oral
or written, express or implied, among FLINT and/or STONE as to such matters other
than as set forth herein, No waiver, change, or modification of this Agreement shall be
valid unless the same Is In writing and is signed by the party to be bound thereby.
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21.
The singular number, when used herein, includes the plural, and viceversa, as the context may require. The masculine, feminine, and neutral genders shall
include such other genders as are appropriate.
22.
If any term or other provision of this Agreement is invalid, illegal, or
incapable of being enforced by any rule of law or public policy, all other conditions and
provisions of this Agreement nevertheless shall remain in full force and effect.
23.
The confidentiality provisions of this Agreement shall not however, apply
to prevent STONE or FLINT from advising its attorneys, tax return preparers, financial
advisors, and/or government tax agencies of the settlement of the claims and the
consideration received therefore. To the extent that FLINT or STONE disclose such
Information to its attorneys, tax return preparers, financial advisors, and/or government
tax agencies, they shall advise those persons of the confidentiality provisions of this
Agreement. Nothing herein prevents the parties from disclosing this agreement its
terms and conditions, In litigation, in a court of law, or Jn an alternative dispute
resolution proceeding,
24.
The parties agree to maintain and/or not remove survey stakes or markers
on their property. This fs not a ratification of said survey, or a waiver of any claim or
nght, but merely a good faith agreement to maintain the alleged boundary for the
benefit of both parties to this agreement. To the extent that such markers or stakes
have bean removed by STONE'S animals or otherwise, the parties agree to replace the
same if the original location is known to them and it is located on their Individual
property, This does not give either party the right to trespass onto the other's property
to move or replace a stake.
25.
This Agreement shall in all respects be interpreted, enforced, and
governed by and under the laws of the State of Utah. The parties agree to pay all
reasonable attorney's fees incurred in enforcing this Agreement,
26.
This Agreement contains the entire agreement, understanding and
stipulation between the parties hereto, The terms of this Agreement &te contractual,
and not a mere recital, and may be enforced In court Any waiver by STONE or FLINT
of a breach or violation of any provision of this Agreement shall not be construed as a
waiver of any other provision or of any subsequent breach or violation of the
Agreement • This Agreement is deemed to have been drafted jointly by the parties.
Any uncertainty or ambiguity shall not be construed for or against any party based on
attribution of drafting to any party.
27.
The parties are encouraged to consult with an attorney of their choice
before signing this Agreement
28.
The parties agree that they are entering Into the Agreement knowingly,
willingly, and voluntarily, and that no promises, representations, or Inducements not
expressly set forth herein were made to them that caused them to sign the Agreement
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THE PARTIES ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THEY HAVE READ AND FULLY
UNDERSTAND THE MEANING AND INTENT OF ALL OF THE PROVISIONS AND
TERMS OF THIS AGREEMENT. INCLUDING THE FINAL BINDING EFFECT.
WITNESS my signature on this 0,71}} day of

<SJWl ik\A
ard Flint

'JL^u^
Stone

r£/p
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Brad C. Smith, No. 6656
David B. Stevenson, No. 12244
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendants
3986 Washington Blvd.
Ogden, UT 84403
Tel.: (801) 394-4573
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MARLENE STONE,

JOINT MOTION FOR STIPULATED
TEMPORARY INJUNCTION

Plaintiff,
vs.
Civil No. 080907234
RICHARD FLINT AND JUDY FLINT,
Defendants.
RICHARD FLINT AND JUDY FLINT,
Counterclaimants,

J eft) /) ~3 /

Judge: Michael D. Lyon

vs.
MARLENE STONE and Does 1-5,
Counterdefendants.
Come now Defendants/Counterclaimants (hereinafter "Defendants"), Richard
Flint and Judy Flint, by and through counsel, David Stevenson, and
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant (hereinafter "Plaintiff), Marlene Stone, by and through'
counsel, Isaac Macfarlane, and moves the Court for a temporary injunction by
stipulation of the parties and requests that an injunction issue enjoining
Counterdefendant, Marlene Stone, and/or her agents from the following:
1.

From trespassing on Defendants' property, located at 6006 S. 7100 West in
Hooper, Utah, and having serial number Serial # 10-124-0001. Plaintiff is

enjoined from being on any part of Defendants1 property, including, but not
limited to, their driveway and unpaved surfaces, private sidewalk adjoining their
porch, and/or their home.
2.

Plaintiff is enjoined from contacting Defendants in any way, including, but not
limited, direct in-person contact, over the telephone, through the internet, at their
places of employment, or otherwise. This also includes any contact through an
agent of the Plaintiff, except for Plaintiff's attorney, real estate agent, or police
officer.

3.

From parking or driving on Defendants' property.

4.

From any stalking behavior, as defined in Utah Code Ann. § 77-3a-101 et seq.
By stipulation, the parties motion that the Court issue a temporary injunction

through the attached order, and that said injunction exist for three years or until such
time as Plaintiff sells her adjoining property lying immediately to the North and East of
Defendants' property, whichever is longer, and with respect to each and every item
listed above.

ENSON & SMITH, P.C.
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Smith
David B. Stevenson
Attorneys for Richard and Judy Flint

ER & ASSOCIATES, PJ4-.C

JL

C. Macfarlane
torney for Marlene Stone

Brad C. Smith, No. 6656
David B. Stevenson, No. 12244
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendants
3986 Washington Blvd.
Ogden, UT 84403
Tel.: (801) 394-4573
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MARLENE STONE,

ORDER FOR TEMPORARY
INJUNCTION

Plaintiff,
vs.
Civil No. 080907234
RICHARD FLINT AND JUDY FLINT,
Defendants.
RICHARD FLINT AND JUDY FLINT,
Counterclaimant,

Judge: Michael D. Lyon

vs.
MARLENE STONE and Does 1-5,
Counterdefendants.
The parties, Defendants Richard Flint and Judy Flint and Plaintiff Marlene Stone,
by and through their respective counsel, having moved the Court for a temporary
injunction by stipulation, and having found good cause for issuing said termporary
injunction, it is therefore ORDERED and DECREED that Plaintiff, Marlene Stone,
and/or her agents are temporarily enjoined:
1.

From trespassing on Defendants' property, located at 6006 S. 7100 West in
Hooper, Utah, and having Serial # 10-124-0001. Plaintiff is enjoined from being
on any part of Defendants' property, including, but not limited to, their driveway

and unpaved surfaces, private sidewalk adjoining their porch, and/or their home.
2.

Plaintiff is enjoined from contacting Defendants in any way, including, but not
limited, direct in-person contact, over the telephone, through the internet, at their
places of employment, or otherwise. This also includes any contact through an
agent of the Plaintiff, except for Plaintiff's attorney, real estate agent, or police
officer.

3.

From parking or driving on Defendants' property.

4.

From any stalking behavior, as defined in Utah Code Ann. § 77-3a-101 et seq.
Said injunction shall exist for three years or until such time as Plaintiff sells her

adjoining property lying immediately to the North and East of Defendants' property,
whichever is longer, and with respect to each and every item listed above.

Judge Michael D. Lyon
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ADDENDUM
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
MARLENE STONE.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Plaintiff,

vs.
RICHARD FLINT and JUDY FLINT,

|

Judge Michael D. Lyon
Case No. 080907234

Defendants.

In this case. Defendants seek a determination, under their counterclaim, that they
purchased from Plaintiff certain personal property as part of a real estate purchase transaction.
All claims under Plaintiffs complaint were resolved through mediation, leaving only
Defendants' claim. The parties tried this case without a jury on April 15 and 20, 2009. Following
closing arguments, the Court took the matter under advisement for a review of the trial evidence
and supporting exhibits. Based on the evidence and controlling law, the Court grants judgment in
favor of Plaintiff, no cause of action on Defendants' counterclaim. The Court also awards
Plaintiff a reasonable attorney fee for her defense of Defendants' counterclaim.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Marlene Stone owned real property known as 6006 S. 7100 W. in Hooper, Utah,
consisting of approximately 17 acres. She listed the property for sale on the multiple listing
service, giving prospective buyers three options: 1) purchase all 17 acres, 2) purchase two acres,
or 3) purchase one acre.
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Defendants Richard Flint and Judy Flint became interested in the property. They and their
realtor, Joe Adair, met with the Plaintiff on February 1, 2008. During this initial meeting,
Plaintiff explained that her husband had recently passed away, that she wanted to be relieved of
the burden of managing the property by herself, and that she was interested in selling, preferably,
all of her 17 acres, including the structures on the property. Mr. Flint inquired, "Does all of this
stuff stay with the property?" Plaintiff replied affirmatively. Both parties seem in agreement that
when Defendant asked his question, he was looking out of Plaintiff s bedroom window, facing to
the east of Plaintiff s property, overlooking the hay barn, horse barn, and various items of
personal property. For ease of description in this decision, the Court will refer to this personal
property collectively as structures. These structures included mobile fencing, called paneis;
mobile gates that interfaces with the panels; open sheds, called loafing sheds, for animals that can
be moved: and a horse walker.
Defendants expressed interest to Plaintiff, however, in purchasing only two acres,
encompassing the home and the two barns. Plaintiff explained that if the Defendants wanted only
two acres, the two acres would not include a strip of her property of approximately 66 feet in
width, lying on the northern part of her property and extending eastward, because she needed an
access to the remaining 15 acres; otherwise, she would essentially be landlocked. Plaintiff further
explained that in order to sell the two acres the Defendants were interested in, encompassing the
home and two barns, she would need to obtain a survey to partition this amount of real estate
from the aggregate 17 acres because, at that time, the exact boundaries of the proposed two acres
were undetermined.
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After the parties discussed Defendants* interest in only two acres, no further discussion
occurred regarding the structures, except regarding the horse walker, as discussed below. In
point, the parties never addressed the structures or where they might be situated after the survey
and partition of two acres from the remaining 15 acres.
Based on the discussions that occurred in Plaintiffs bedroom, the Defendants assumed
that all structures on the entire 17 acres went with the two acres they were would eventually
purchase because Plaintiff did not want to manage the property any more. Plaintiff, on the other
hand, assumed that since the Defendants wanted less than the 17 acres, only the structures
existing on the two acres would pass in the conveyance to the Defendants; she would keep the
structures situated on the remaining 15 acres.
Later that same day, February 1, 2008, Mr. Adair, Defendants' realtor, prepared and
presented to Plaintiff a real estate purchase contract (hereafter "REPC"). The first addendum to
the REPC provided that Plaintiff would have the property surveyed and the four corners staked to
Defendants' satisfaction prior to closing of the sale. The first addendum also listed the structures
included in the sale: "All lounging/loafing sheds, panels, gates, feeders/waterers and horse
walker as presently exist."
When the Defendants presented the REPC through Mr. Adair, she told him that, if they
wanted the horse walker, the Defendants would need to move it completely on to the two acres.
As of February 1, 2008, the base of the horse walker was situated on the eventual ground that
was part of the 66-foot-wide access reserved by Plaintiff, although the arm of the horse walker
rotated partially into the two acres the Defendants would purchase. Further, the electric motor
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operating the horse walker was wired to the barn, also within the two acres that the Defendants
were receiving as part of the two acres. Otherwise, Plaintiff accepted the Defendants' offer.
As the parties agreed. Plaintiff had the property surveyed and the four corners of the
property staked just prior to the closing on the property on April 16, 2008. Defendants physically
inspected the staked property they were to purchase and were satisfied with the boundaries. Even
at this juncture of the parties' dealings, no further discussions occurred regarding the structures,
as they may lie inside and outside the two acres.
The boundaries of the two acres Defendants purchased are defined by the pencil line on
exhibit PI. On exhibit PI, north is to the top of the exhibit and west is to the left of the exhibit.
The northern boundary of the two acres abuts the 66-foot-wide strip Plaintiff retained ownership
in for access to the remaining 15 acres of her property. Included in the boundaries of the two
acres are the home in the lower left-hand corner of the exhibit, the two bams identified with the
letters G and H, and the structures defined with the letters F, D, and I. Excluded from the
boundaries of the two acres, and appearing in Plaintiffs access, are three loafing sheds defined
with letters A. B, and C. Structure A abuts the property line between Plaintiffs property and a
third party neighbor. Structure E also remains on Plaintiffs remaining property that extends to
the east.
In purchasing the home and the two acres, Defendants assumed the original address of
6006 S. 7100 W. in Hooper, Utah. Hooper City gave Plaintiff a new address for her remaining
15 acres, known as 5990 S. 7100 W., Hooper, Utah.
Contemporaneous with the closing on the real property, the title company prepared a bill
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of sale that Plaintiff signed and Defendants accepted in the closing. The bill of sale transferred
title to "that certain personal real property now at 6006 S. 7100 W., Hooper, Utah" (emphasis
added). The bill of sale then enumerated the personal property specified in the first addendum to
the RJEPC "as presently exist."
Also contemporaneous with the closing, Plaintiff leased to Defendants the remaining 15
acres of her property to Defendants for one year. That lease was later broken in 2008, and the
parties resolved their rights and liabilities under that lease through mediation after Plaintiff filed
suit. Thus, those matters are not before the Court. Nonetheless, it is relevant in this proceeding
that, as a result of friction between the parties stemming from Defendants' use of the remaining
15 acres under the lease agreement, the parties realized that each side had a different
interpretation of the REPC and bill of sale regarding the meaning of "all" of the structures.
Defendants believed they had purchased all of the structures existing on the 17 acres, whereas
Plaintiff believed she had sold only all of the structures on the two acres that she had conveyed to
the Defendants.
ISSUES PRESENTED
This dispute in the interpretation of the REPC and the bill of sale is the crux of the
lawsuit between the parties. Defendants contend that the language of the REPC and bill of sale
gave them "all lounging/loafing sheds, panels, gates, feeders/waterers and horse walker as
presently exist," both on the two acres they had purchased and on the 15 acres retained by the
Plaintiff. On the other hand. Plaintiff argues that Defendants received only the structures on the
property they purchased. At issue is whether the word all, as used in the REPC and bill of sale, is
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ambiguous. The Court holds that it is not ambiguous.
ANALYSIS
Contractual ambiguity may occur in two contexts: "(1) facial ambiguity with regard to the
language of the contract and (2) ambiguity with regard to the intent of the contracting parties."
Dairies v Vincent, 2008 UT 51, f 25, 190 P.3d 1269, 1276. The Utah Supreme Court went on to
further clarify: "The first context presents a question of law to be determined by the judge. The
second context presents a question of fact where, if the judge determines that the contract is
facially ambiguous, parol evidence of the parties' intentions should be admitted." Id. However,
"before permitting recourse to parol evidence, a court must make a determination of facial
ambiguity." Id. In other words, extrinsic evidence offered to show that an ambiguity exists does
not "trump 'the language of the contract.'" Flores v. Earnshaw, 2009 UT App 90, ^| 10, quoting
Daines, 2008 UT APP 51 at ^27, 190 P.3d at 1276. In short, unless the Court finds that the
language of the REPC is ambiguous, it may not consider parol evidence, or the discussions of
what occurred upstairs in Plaintiffs bedroom concerning what personal property goes with the
real estate conveyance. The contract controls the rights of the parties.
Thus, the first responsibility of this Court is to determine whether a facial ambiguity
exists. The Utah Supreme Court clarified the procedure for determining whether a contract is
facially ambiguous also in Daines, where the Court set forth a two-step analysis. First,
"when determining whether a contract is ambiguous, any relevant evidence must
be considered. Otherwise, the determination of ambiguity is inherently one-sided,
namely, it is based solely on the extrinsic evidence of the judge's own linguistic
- education and experience." Second, after a judge considers relevatnt and credible
evidence of contrary interpretations, the judge must ensure that "the
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interpretations contended for are reasonably supported by the language of the
contract."
Id. at Tl 26, 190 P.3d at 1276, quoting Ward v Intermountain Farmers Ass 'n, 907 P.2d 264, 268
(Utah 1995). The Court later clarified that "we [do] not intend that a judge allow surrounding
circumstances to create ambiguity where the language of a contract would not otherwise permit."
Dames, 2008 UT 51, at ^27, 190 P.3d at 1276.
The Utah Court of Appeals applied these principles in Flores, 2009 UT App 90. In
Flores, the parties entered into an agreement for the sale of a "yet-to-be-built condominium unit."
Id. at Tf 1. Although the building itself did not yet exist, the parties used a standard real estate
purchase contract (REPC) to accomplish the sale. Clause 1.1 of the REPC, entitled "Included
Items" stated: "Unless excluded herein, this sale includes the following items if presently owned
and attached to the Property . . . " Id. at \ 5 (emphasis added by Flores court). The trial court
determined that the surrounding circumstances of the case, including the fact that the building
had not yet been built, rendered clause 1.1 ambiguous. The court of appeals disagreed, holding
that clause 1.1 was not facially ambiguous. Id. at ^f 14. The court emphasized that "the
enumerated items are included in the sale only if they were presently owned and attached to the
Property." Id. Since the building had not yet been constructed, "none of the items listed in
clause 1.1 were owned and attached to the property at the time the REPC was executed[.]" Id.
The court concluded that "based on the plain language of the REPC, the parties intended for the
sale to convey only a 'shell' of [the unit]." Id.
The Flores case is factually similar to the present case. Plaintiff and Defendants have a
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signed agreement identifying what is included in the sale. Clause 1.1 of their agreement is
identical to clause 1.1 of the contract in Floras. It states that the listed items are included "if
presently owned and attached to the Property.'' The Court determines that, as in Floras, this
provision is unambiguous and cannot be read to include any items that were not "presently
owned and attached to the Property,'' namely, the two acres Defendants purchased. The property
included in the sale, identified as a pencil line on Plaintiffs exhibit PI, includes the house, the
two barns labeled G and H, and the structures labeled F, D, and I. It does not include the loafing
sheds labeled A, B. and E, nor the panels or gates on most of the structure labeled C. Those
structures are not "presently owned and attached to the Property" to be conveyed and, under the
unambiguous terms of the contract, were not intended to be conveyed to Defendants.
Moreover, the bill of sale, which is the final, integrated expression of the parties' intent
concerning the transfer of personal property in this transaction, transferred only those items of
personal property presently existing on the two acres conveyed or otherwise specifically
identified, such as the horse walker. The bill of sale plainly states what Plaintiff sold to
Defendants, namely, "that certain personal property now at 6006 S. 7100 W., Hooper, Utah,
more particularly described as follows: oven/range, refrigerator, window coverings, 2 water
irrigation shares, all lounging and loafing sheds, panels, gates, feeders, waterers, and horse
walker as presently exist." (Emphasis added.) Consequently, the Defendants received only three
loafing sheds on their newly acquired real property, not the other three remaining on Plaintiffs
property. Likewise, they received the panels and gates on their property, as well as the waterers
and feeders on their property. While the base of the horse walker was on Plaintiffs property, and
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thus may technically be on her property, because it also rotated partially on Defendants' property
and because the apparatus was wired to the barn. Plaintiff chose to allow them to have it,
provided they moved it completely on to their property.
Plaintiff is entitled to a reasonable attorney fee for the successful defense of Defendants'
counterclaim, as provided in paragraph 17 of the REPC. Accordingly, she may present her
counsel's affidavit to the Court, sending also a copy to Defendants' counsel to give him an
opportunity to object to the reasonableness of the fees. As counsel prepares the affidavit, the
Court reminds the parties that reasonable attorney fees are not merely measured by what an
attorney actually bills and the number of hours spent on the case. Rather, in determining fees, the
Court should consider those factors addressed in case law, namely, what work was actually
performed, the work reasonably necessary to adequately defend the matter, the attorney's billing
rate and whether it is consistent with customary rates in the locality, and any other circumstances
listed in the Code of Professional Responsibility. See Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985,
990 (Utah 1988).
CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding the respective expectations or understandings of the parties arising from
their discussions upon their initial meeting on February 1, 2008, the real estate purchase contract
superceded all prior negotiations, representations, and understandings of the parties, as the clear
language of paragraph 14 of the REPC provides. Moreover, the Court concludes, as a matter of
law, that the REPC and the bill of sale governing the transfer of the personal property and
structures are both unambiguous. Defendants are entitled to all structures that exist on the two
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acres at the time of the contract and at closing, unless otherwise expressly provided in the
contract or bill of sale.
Dated this (jH day of April, 2009.

Michael D Lyon, Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the C\3 day of April, 2009,1 sent a true and correct copy of the
foregoing ruling to counsel as follows:
Robert L. Neeley
Attorney for Plaintiff
2485 Grant Avenue, Suite 200
Ogden, Utah 84401
David B. Stevenson
Attorney for Defendants

Brad C. Smith, No. 6656
David B. Stevenson, No. 12244
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C.
3986 Washington Blvd.
Ogden, Utah 84403
Tel: (801)394-4573
Fax:(801)394-9954

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF: UTAH
MARLENE STONE,

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Plaintiff and Appellee
Trial Court No. 080907234

vs.

RICHARD FLINT and JUDY FLINT,

Defendants/Counterclaimants
and Appellants.
Notice is hereby given that defendants/counterclaimants and appeHants, Richard
Flint and Judy Flint, by and through counsel, appeal to the Utah Supreme Court the final
judgment of the Honorable Michael D. Lyon entered in this matter on June 1, 2009. The
appeal is taken from the entire judgment.

DATED this flfo day of June, 2009.

^)Q
David B. Stevenson, Attorney for
Defendants/Counterclaimants/Appellees

Brad C. Smith, No. 6656
David B. Stevenson, No. 12244
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C.
3986 Washington Blvd.
Ogden, Utah 84403
Tel: (801)394-4573
Fax:(801)394-9954

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MARLENE STONE,
Plaintiff and Appellee

vs.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE OF
NOTICE OF APPEAL

Trial Court No. 080907234

RICHARD FLINT and JUDY FLINT,

Defendants/Counterclaimants
and Appellants.
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this day I mailed, postage prepaid, a true and
correct copy of Defendants/Counterclaimants and Appellants' Notice of Appeal to the
following individual(s):

Robert Neeley
Neeley & Neeley
2485 Grant Ave., #200
Ogden, UT 84401

DATED this ffiV day of June, 2009.
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NEELEY & NEELEY
ROBERT L. NEELEY [2373]
Attorney for Plaintiff
2485 Grant Ave, Suite 200
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone: (801) 621-3646
Fax No.: (801) 621-3652
bobneeley@yahoo. com
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OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

MARLENE STONE,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
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VS.

RICHARD FLINT and JUDY FLINT,

Civil No. 080907234 £Vi
Judge: Michael D. Lyon
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Defendants.
Non-jury trial in the above-entitled matter come on regularly for hearing before the aboveentitled Court on April 15 and April 20,2009. Plaintiff, Marlene Stone, was personally present and
represented by her attorney, Robert L. Neeley, and Defendants, Richard Flint and Judy Flint, were
personally present and represented by their attorney, David B. Stevenson. Plaintiff and Defendants
were sworn and testified, together with witness Joe Adair and the court having received exhibits
from Plaintiff and Defendants and having taken the matter under advisement and having issued its
Memorandum Decision, therefore makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Plaintiff, Marlene Stone, owned real property known as 6006 S. 7100 W. in Hooper, Utah,
consisting of approximately 17 acres.
2. Plaintiff listed the property for sale on the multiple listing service, giving prospective
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buyers three options: 1) purchase all 17 acres, 2) purchase two acres, or 3) purchase one acre.
3. Defendants, Richard Flint and Judy Flint, became interested in the property. They and
their realtor, Joe Adair, met with the Plaintiff on February, 1, 2008.
4. During this initial meeting, Plaintiff explained that her husband had recently passed away,
that she wanted to be relieved of the burden of managing the property by herself, and that she was
interested in selling, preferably, all of her 17 acres, including the structures on the property. Mr.
Flint inquired, "Does all of this stuff stay with the property?" Plaintiff replied affirmatively. Both
parties seem in agreement that when Defendant asked his question, he was looking out of Plaintiff s
bedroom window, facing to the east of Plaintiffs property, overlooking the hay barn, horse barn, and
various items of personal property. These structures included mobile fencing, called panels; mobile
gates that interface with the panels; open sheds, called loafing sheds, for animals that can be moved;
and a horse walker.
5. Defendants expressed interest to Plaintiff, however, in purchasing only two acres,
encompassing the home and the two barns.
6. Plaintiff explained that if the Defendants wanted only two acres, the two acres would not
include a strip of her property approximately 66 feet in width, lying on the northern part of her
property and extending eastward, because she needed access to the remaining 15 acres; otherwise,
she would essentially be landlocked.
7. Plaintiff further explained that in order to sell the two acres the Defendants were interested
in, encompassing the home and barns, she would need to obtain a survey to partition this amount of
real estate from the aggregate 17 acres because, at that time, the exact boundaries of the proposed
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two acres were undetermined.
8. After the parties discussed Defendants' interest in only two acres, no further discussion
occurred regarding the structures, except regarding the horse walker, as discussed below. In point,
the parties never addressed the structures or where they might be situated after the survey and
partition of two acres from the remaining 15 acres.
9. Based on the discussions that occurred in Plaintiffs bedroom, the Defendants assumed
that all structures on the entire 17 acres went with the two acres they would eventually purchase
because Plaintiff did not want to manage the property anymore.
10. Plaintiff, on the other hand, assumed that since Defendants wanted less than the 17 acres,
only the structures existing on the two acres would pass in the conveyance to the Defendants; she
would keep the structures situated on the remaining 15 acres.
11. Later that same day, February 1, 2008, Mr. Adair, Defendants' realtor, prepared and
presented to Plaintiff a real estate purchase contract (hereafter "REPC"). The first addendum to the
REPC provided that Plaintiff would have the property surveyed and the four corners staked to
Defendants' satisfaction prior to closing of the sale. The first addendum also listed the structures
included in the sale: "all lounging/loafing sheds, panels, gates, feeders/waterers and horse walker as
presently exist."
12. When the Defendants presented the REPC through Mr. Adair, she told him that, if they
wanted the horse walker, the Defendants would need to move it completely on to the two acres. As
of February 1,2008, the base of the horse walker was situated on the eventual ground that was part
of the 66-foot-wide access reserved by Plaintiff, although the arm of the horse walker rotated
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partially into the two acres the Defendants would purchase. Further, the electric motor operating the
horse walker was wired to the barn, also within the two acres that the Defendants were receiving as
part of the two acres. Otherwise, Plaintiff accepted the Defendants' offer.
13. As the parties agreed, Plaintiff had the property surveyed and the four corners of the
property staked just prior to the closing on the property on April 16, 2008. Defendants physically
inspected the staked property they were to purchase and were satisfied with the boundaries. Even
at this juncture of the parties' dealings, no further discussions occurred regarding the structures, as
they may lie inside and outside the two acres.
14. The boundaries of the two acres Defendants purchased are defined by the pencil line on
exhibit PI. On exhibit PI, north is the top of the exhibit and west is to the left of the exhibit. The
northern boundary of the two acres abuts the 66-foot-wide strip Plaintiff retained ownership in for
access to the remaining 15 acres of her property. Included in the boundaries of the two acres are the
home in the lower left-hand corner of the exhibit, the two barns identified with the letters G and H,
and the structures defined with the letters F, D, and I. Excluded from the boundaries of the two
acres, and appearing in Plaintiffs access, are the three loafing sheds defined with the letters A, B,
and C. Structure A abuts the property line between Plaintiffs property and a third party neighbor.
Structure E also remains on Plaintiffs remaining property that extends to the east.
15. In purchasing the home and the two acres, Defendants assumed the original address of
6006 S. 7100 W. in Hooper, Utah. Hooper City gave Plaintiff a new address for her remaining 15
acres, known as 5990 S. 7100 W., Hooper, Utah.
16. Contemporaneous with the closing on the real property, the title company prepared a bill
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of sale that Plaintiff signed and Defendants accepted in the closing. The bill of sale transferred title
to uthat certain personal real property now at 6006 S. 7100 W.3 Hooper, Utah." The bill of sale then
enumerated the personal property specified in the first addendum to the REPC "as presently exist."
17. Also contemporaneous with the closing, Plaintiff leased to Defendants the remaining 15
acres of her property to Defendants for one year. That lease was later broken in 2008, and the parties
resolved their rights and liabilities under that lease through mediation after Plaintiff filed suit. Thus,
those matters are not before the Court. Nonetheless, it is relevant in this proceeding that, as a result
of friction between the parties stemming from Defendants' use of the remaining 15 acres under the
lease agreement, the parties realized that each side had a different interpretation of the REPC and
bill of sale regarding the meaning of "all" of the structures. Defendants believed they had purchased
all of the structures existing on the 17 acres, whereas Plaintiff believed she had sold only all of the
structures on the two acres that she had conveyed to the Defendants.
THE COURT having entered its Findings of Fact makes the following Conclusions of Law:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. At issue is whether the word all, as used in the REPC and bill of sale, is ambiguous. The
Court holds that it is not ambiguous.
2. Contractual ambiguity may occur in two contexts: "(1) fecial ambiguity with regard to the
language of the contract and (2) ambiguity with regard to the intent of the contracting parties."
Dairies v. Vincent, 2008 UT 51 ^ 25, 190 P.3d 1269, 1276. The Utah Supreme Court went on to
further clarify: "The first context presents a question of law to be determined by the judge. The
second context presents a question of fact where, if the judge determines that the contract is facially
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ambiguous, parol evidence of the parties' intentions should be admitted." Id. However, "before
permitting recourse to parol evidence, a court must make a determination of facial ambiguity." Id.
In other words, extrinsic evidence offered to show that an ambiguity exists does not "trump 'the
language of the contract.'" Flores v. Earnshaw, 2009 UT App 90 \ 10, quoting Dairies, 2008 UT
APP 51 at K 27,190 P.3d at 1276. In short, unless the Court finds that the language of the REPC is
ambiguous, it may not consider parol evidence, or the discussions of what occurred upstairs in
Plaintiffs bedroom concerning what personal property goes with the real estate conveyance. The
contract controls the rights of the parties.
3. Thus, the first responsibility of this Court is to determine whether a facial ambiguity
exists. The Utah Supreme Court clarified the procedure for determining whether a contract is
facially ambiguous also in Dairies, where the Court set forth a two-step analysis. First,
"When determining whether a contract is ambiguous, any relevant evidence must be
considered. Otherwise, the determination of ambiguity is inherently one-sided, namely, it is based
solely on the extrinsic evidence of the judge's own linguistic education and experience." Second,
after a judge considers relevant and credible evidence of contrary interpretations, the judge must
ensure that "the interpretations contended for are reasonably supported by the language of the
contract."
Id. at \ 26, 190 P.3d at 1276, quoting Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Ass'n, 907 P.2d 264, 268
(Utah 1995). The Court later clarified that "we [do] not intend that a judge allow surrounding
circumstances to create ambiguity where the language of the contract would not otherwise permit."
Dairies, 2008 UT 51, at f 27, 190 P.3d at 1276.
4. The Flores case is factually similar to the present case. Plaintiff and Defendants have a
signed agreement identifying what is included in the sale. Clause 1.1 of their agreement is identical
to clause 1.1 of the contract in Flores. It states that the listed items are included "if presently owned
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and attached to the Property."

The Court determines that, as in Flores, this provision is

unambiguous and cannot be read to include any items that were not "presently owned and attached
to the Property," namely, the two acres Defendants purchased. The property included in the sale,
identified as a pencil line on Plaintiffs exhibit PI, includes the house, the two barns labeled G and
H, and the structures labeled F, D, and I. It does not include the loafing sheds labeled A, B, and E,
nor the panels or gates on most of the structure labeled C. Those structures are not "presently owned
and attached to the Property" to be conveyed and, under the unambiguous terms of the contract, were
not intended to be conveyed to Defendants.
5. Moreover, the bill of sale, which is the final, integrated expression of the parties' intent
concerning the transfer of personal property in this transaction, transferred only those items of
personal property presently existing on the two acres conveyed or otherwise specifically identified,
such as the horse walker. The bill of sale plainly states what Plaintiff sold to Defendants, namely,
"that certain personal property now at 6006 S. 7100 W., Hooper, Utah,..., more particularly described
as follows: oven/range, refrigerator, window coverings, 2 water irrigation shares, all lounging and
loafing sheds, panels, gates, feeders, waterers, and horse walker as presently exist." Consequently,
the Defendants received only three loafing sheds on their newly acquired real property, not the other
three remaining on Plaintiffs property. Likewise, they received the panels and gates on their
property, as well as the waterers and feeders on their property. While the base of the horse walker
was on Plaintiffs property, and thus may technically be on her property, because it also rotated
partially on Defendants' property and because the apparatus was wired to the barn, Plaintiff chose
to allow them to have it, provided they moved it completely on to their property.
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6. Plaintiff is entitled to a reasonable attorney fee for the successful defense of Defendants'
counterclaim, as provided in paragraph 17 of the REPC.
7. Notwithstanding the respective expectations or understandings of the parties arising from
their discussion upon their initial meeting on February 1, 2008, the real estate purchase contract
superceded all prior negotiations, representations, and understandings of the parties, as the clear
language of paragraph 14 of the REPC provides. Moreover, the Court concludes, as a matter of law,
that the REPC and the bill of sale governing the transfer of the personal property and structures are
both unambiguous. Defendants are entitled to all structures that exist on the two acres at the time
of the contract and at closing, unless otherwise expressly provided in the contract or bill of sale.

DATED this _f__ day of M a ^ 0 0 9 .
APPROVED AND ORDERED BY:

/I
MICHAEL D. LYON
District Court Judge /

V

i.r.
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, WEBER COUNTY
OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

MARLENE STONE,
ORDER DISMISSING RESPONDENT'S
COUNTERCLAIM

Plaintiff,
VS.

RICHARD FLINT and JUDY FLINT,

Civil No. 080907234
Judge: Michael D. Lyon

Defendants.
Non-jury trial in the above-entitled matter come on regularly for hearing before the aboveentitled Court on April 15 and April 20,2009. Plaintiff, Marlene Stone, was personally present and
represented by her attorney, Robert L. Neeley, and Defendants, Richard Flint and Judy Flint, were
personally present and represented by their attorney, David B. Stevenson. Plaintiff and Defendants
were sworn and testified, together with witness Joe Adair and the court having entered its Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now
HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES as follows, to-wit:
1. Defendants', Richard Flint and Judy Flint, counterclaim against Plaintiff, Marlene Stone,
be and is hereby dismissed for no cause of action.
2. Plaintiff, Marlene Stone, is awarded $ $ft(/Q

tJQL

as and for attorney fees and

as and for costs of court against Defendants, Richard Flint and Judy Flint.
Order Dismissing Respondent's Counterclaim

0087
VD28929390

paqes: 2

ORDER DISMISSING RESPONDENT'S COUNTERCLAIM
Stone v Flint
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Oum
DATED this

/ day of May 2009.
APPROVED AND ORDERED BY:

ft

MICHAEL D LYO:
District Court Judge
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Boyden, 2006 UT 14, 133 P.3d 370.
P r e s u m p t i o n upheld.
Where mother executed will and trust instrument, and it was later found t h a t the will had

Rule 401

been executed as a result of undue influence,
there was a prima facie presumption of continued undue influence with respect to an alleged
subsequent ratification of the trust. Robertson
v. Campbell, 674 P.2d 1226 (Utah 1983).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
U t a h L a w Review. — Utah Rules of Evidence 1983, 1985 Utah L. Rev. 63, 75.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 29 Am Jur. 2d Evidence
§§ 159 to 165, 167.
C.J.S. — 31A C J.S. Evidence § 130 et seq.
A.L.R. — Effect of presumption as evidence
or upon burden of proof, where controverting
evidence is introduced, 5 A.L.R.3d 19.
Refusal of defendant in "public figure" libel
case to identify claimed sources as raising presumption against existence of source, 19
A.L.R.4th 919.

Presumptions and evidence respecting identification of land on which property taxes were
paid to establish adverse possession, 36
A.L.R.4th 843.
Applicability of res ipsa loquitur in case of
multiple, nonmedical defendants — modern
status, 59 A.L.R.4th 201.
Medical malpractice: presumption or inference from failure of hospital or doctor to produce relevant medical records, 69 A.L.R.4th
906.

Rule 302, Applicability of federal law in civil actions and
proceedings.
In civil actions and proceedings, the effect of a presumption respecting a fact
which is an element of a claim or defense as to which federal law supplies the
rule of decision is determined in accordance with federal law.
Advisory Committee N o t e . — The text of
this rule is taken from Rule 302, Uniform Rules
of Evidence (1974). Presumptions in criminal

cases are not treated in this rule. See Utah
Code Annotated, Section 76-1-503 (1953) or any
subsequent revision of that section.

ARTICLE IV. RELEVANCY
AND ITS LIMITS
Rule 401. Definition of "relevant evidence."
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact t h a t is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable t h a n it would be without the evidence.
Advisory C o m m i t t e e N o t e . — This rule is
the federal rule, verbatim, and is comparable in
substance to Rule 1(2), Utah Rules of Evidence
(1971), but the former rule defined relevant
evidence as that having a tendency to prove or

disprove the existence of any "material fact."
Avoiding the use of the term "material fact"
accords with the application given to former
Rule 1(2) by the Utah Supreme Court. State v.
Peterson, 560 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1977).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Burden of proof.
Demonstrative evidence.
—Photographs.
Discovery.
Effect of remoteness.
Relationship to crime charged.
Relevance.
Victim's testimony on defense theory.
Cited.
B u r d e n of proof.
The defendant failed to meet his burden to
lay the necessary two-part foundation of relevance to admit evidence of the witness's health
history, offered for the purpose of attacking the

witness's credibility, because he did not show
t h a t the witness's mental health disorder impaired the witness's ability to accurately perceive, recall, and relate events, nor did defend a n t offer evidence t h a t the disability was
contemporaneous with the witness's observations or testimony. State v. Stewart, 925 P. 2d
598 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
In a prosecution for rape, it was not error to
exclude testimony of defendant's expert on Japanese cultural values since its only relevance
was to the credibility of the victim, not any
elements of the crime, and defendant did not
lay a proper foundation for its admission. State
v. Finlayson, 956 P.2d 283 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
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Cited in State v. Gray, 717 R2d 1313 (Utah
1986); State v. Nickles, 728 R2d 123 (Utah
1986); Meyers v. Salt Lake City Corp , 747 R2d
1058 (Utah Ct. App 1988); Fisher ex rel Fisher
v. Trapp, 748 R2d 204 (Utah Ct. App. 1988);
Belden v. Dalbo, Inc., 752 P 2 d 1317 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988); State v. Worthen, 765 R2d 839
(Utah 1988); State v. Maurer, 770 R2d 981
(Utah 1989); State, In re R.D.S , 777 R2d 532

Rule 402

(Utah Ct. App. 1989) Whitehead v. American
Motors Sales Corp., 801 P.2d 920 (Utah 1990);
State v. Pascual, 804 P 2 d 553 (Utah Ct. App.
1991); State v. Larsen, 828 P 2 d 487 (Utah Ct.
App. 1992); State v. 633 E. 640 N , 942 P.2d 925
(Utah 1997); State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2000
UT 59, 6 P.3d 1120; State v. Balfour, 2008 UT
App 410, 198 P 3d 471.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
U t a h L a w Review. — U t a h Rules of Evidence 1983, 1985 Utah L. Rev. 63, 78
United States v. Downing: Novel Scientific
Evidence and the Rejection of Frye, 1986 Utah
L. Rev. 839.
A.L.R. — Admissibility of evidence of absence of other accidents or injuries at place

where injury or damage occurred, 10 A L R 5th
371.
Admissibility of evidence in homicide case
that victim was threatened by one other t h a n
defendant, 11 AL.R.Sth 831.
Admissibility and use of evidence of nonuse
of bicycle helmets, 2 A.L.R.6th 429.

Rule 402, Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrelevant evidence inadmissible.
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah,
statute, or by these rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this state.
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.
Advisory Committee N o t e . — The text of
this rule is Rule 402, Uniform Rules of Evidence (1974) except that prior to the word
"statute" the words "Constitution of the United
States" have been added.

Compiler's N o t e s . — The U t a h rule also
adds the words "or the Constitution of the state
of Utah" to Rule 402, Uniform Rules of Evidence (1974).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Discretion of court.
Effect of remoteness.
Harmless error.
Irrelevant evidence.
Other crimes.
Probability evidence.
Relevance.
Scientific evidence.
Standard of review.
Cited.
D i s c r e t i o n of court.
The trial court is given considerable discretion in deciding whether or not evidence submitted is relevant. Bambrough v Bethers, 552
R2d 1286 (Utah 1976).
While relevant evidence is generally admissible, a trial court has broad discretion to determine whether proffered evidence is relevant,
and the appellate court will find error in a
relevancy ruling only if the trial court has
abused its discretion. State v. Harrison, 805
R2d 769 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 817 R2d
327 (Utah 1991).
In a personal injury action, the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence
of plaintiff's prior injuries because they were
relevant to the issues of causation and damages. Ortiz v. Geneva Rock Prods., Inc., 939
R2d 1213 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).
Effect of r e m o t e n e s s .
Remoteness usually goes to the weight of the

evidence and not its admissibility. Terry v.
Zions Coop. Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314
(Utah 1979), overruled on other grounds, McFarland v. Skaggs Cos., Inc., 678 P 2 d 298 (Utah
1984).
H a r m l e s s error.
Even if the admission of testimony regarding
the ammunition and firing status of firearms
used in the commission of a crime was erroneous, that error was harmless where the defendant objected only to the first attempt to admit
the evidence and failed to raise an objection to
the admission of the testimony from later witnesses, since the evidence would have been
before the jury and the reviewing court could
not say there was a reasonable likelihood of a
more favorable result. State v. Kohl, 2000 UT
35, 999 P.2d 7.
Irrelevant e v i d e n c e .
Testimony as to impulsiveness of another
participant in the crime had no bearing on
defendant's guilt or innocence and was properly
excluded as not relevant to defendant's participation in the crime. State v. Stephens, 667 P 2d
586 (Utah 1983)
Trial judge did not err in refusing to admit
evidence related to the claim of right defense,
as the claim of right defense was not a n available defense to the crime of robbery; t h u s v any
evidence relating to the defense was irrelevant.
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Rule 801

prosecution to ex parte in camera hearing on
request for state-funded expert witness, 83
AL.R.Sth 541.

ARTICLE VIII. HEARSAY
Rule 801. Definitions.
The following definitions apply under this article:
(a) Statement. A "statement" is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2)
nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion.
(b) Declarant. A "declarant" is a person who makes a statement.
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the declarant
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of
the matter asserted.
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if:
(d)(1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or
hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement and the
statement is (A) inconsistent with the declarant's testimony or the witness
denies having made the statement or has forgotten, or (B) consistent with the
declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge
against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive, or
(C) one of identification of a person made after perceiving the person; or
(d)(2) Admission by party-opponent. The statement is offered against a
party and is (A) the party's own statement, in either an individual or a
representative capacity, or (B) a statement of which the party has manifested
an adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a statement by a person authorized by
the party to make a statement concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by
the party's agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency
or employment, made during the existence of the relationship, or (E) a
statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance
of the conspiracy
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)
Advisory Committee Note. — Subsection
(a) is in accord with Rule 62(1), Utah Rules of
Evidence (1971).
Subsection (b) is in accord with Rule 62(2),
Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). The hearsay
rule is not applicable in declarations of devices
and machines, e.g., radar. The definition of
"hearsay" in subdivision (c) is substantially the
same as Rule 63, Utah Rules of Evidence
(1971).
Subdivision (d)(1) is similar to Rule 63(1),
Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). It deviates from
the federal rule in that it allows use of prior
statements as substantive evidence if (1) inconsistent or (2) the witness has forgotten, and
does not require the prior statement to have
been given under oath or subject to perjury. The
former Utah rules admitted such statements as
an exception to the hearsay rule. See California
v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970), with respect to
confrontation problems under the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Subdivision (d)(1) is as originally promulgated
by the United States Supreme Court with the
addition of the language "or the witness denies
having made the statement or has forgotten"
and is in keeping with the prior Utah rule and
the actual effect on most juries.
Subdivision (d)(1)(B) is in substance the
same as Rule 63(1), Utah Rules of Evidence

(1971). The Utah court has been liberal in its
interpretation of the applicable rule in this
general area. State v. Sibert, 6 Utah 2d 198,310
P.2d 388 (1957).
Subdivision (d)(1)(C) comports with prior
Utah case law. State v. Owens, 15 Utah 2d 123,
388 R2d 797 (1964); State v. Vasquez, 22 Utah
2d 277, 451 P.2d 786 (1969).
The substance of subdivision (d)(2)(A) was
contained in Rules 63(6) and (7), Utah Rules of
Evidence (1971), as an exception to the hearsay
rule.
Similar provisions to subdivisions (d)(2)(B)
and (C) were contained in Rule 63(8), Utah
Rules of Evidence (1971), as an exception to the
hearsay rule.
Rule 63(9), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971),
was of similar substance and scope to subdivision (d)(2)(D), except that Rule 63(9) required
that the declarant be unavailable before such
admissions are received. Adoptive and vicarious admissions have been recognized as admissible in criminal as well as civil cases State v.
Kerekes, 622 R2d 1161 (Utah 1980).
Statements by a coconspirator of a party
made during the course and in furtherance of
the conspiracy, admissible as non-hearsays under subdivision (d)(2)(E), have traditionally
been admitted as exceptions to the hearsay
rule. State v. Erwin, 101 Utah 365,120 R2d 285
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Rule 802

128 P.3d 1151; Taylor v. State, 2007 UT 12, 570
U t a h Adv. Rep. 25, 156 P.3d 739.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
U t a h L a w Review. — Utah Rules of Evidence 1983 — Part III, 1995 Utah L Rev. 683.
B r i g h a m Young Law Review. — The Hobgoblin of the Federal Rules of Evidence: An
Analysis of Rule 801(d)(1)(B), Prior Consistent
Statements and a New Proposal, 1987 B.Y.U. L.
Rev. 231.
J o u r n a l of Contemporary Law, — Comment, Victims of Child Sexual Abuse in the
Courtroom: New Utah Rules and Their Constitutional Implications, 15 J. Contemp. L. 81
(1989).
Am. Jur. 2d. — 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence
§ 493 et seq.
C.J.S. — 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 259 et seq.
A.L.R. — Admissibility of impeached wit-

ness' prior consistent statement — modern
state criminal cases, 58 A L R 4th 1014
Admissibility of tape recording or transcript
of "911" emergency telephone call, 3 A.L R.5th
784.
Admissibility in evidence of composite picture or sketch produced by police to identify
offender, 23 A.L.R.5th 672.
Admissibility as "not hearsay" of statement
by party's attorney under Federal Rules of
Evidence 801(d)(2)(C) or 801(d)(2)(D), 117
A L . R Fed. 599.
Interpreter or translator as party's agent for
purposes of "admission by party-opponent" exception to hearsay rule (Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 801 (d)(2)(D)), 121 A.L.R. Fed. 611.

Rule 802. Hearsay rule.
Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by law or by these rules.
Advisory Committee N o t e . — This rule is
Rule 802 of the Uniform Rules of Evidence
(1974), and is the same as the first paragraph of
Rule 63, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971).
Cross-References. —Affidavits, taking and
certification of, § 78B-5-701 et seq.
Contemporaneous entries and writings of de-

cedent as prima facie evidence, § 78B-5-607.
Marriage certificate, issuance and filing,
§§ 30-1-6, 30-1-12.
Official records as evidence, § 78B-5-602;
U.R.C.P. 44.
Recording conveyances, § 57-3-101 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
In general.
Chemical breath analysis.
Nonhearsay.
Purpose.
Cited.

inadmissible, t h e husband and wife failed to set
forth admissible evidence to demonstrate a
genuine issue for trial on their breach of contract claim. Moss v. Parr Waddoups Brown Gee
& Loveless, 2008 UT App 405, 197 R3d 659.

In general.
Hearsay is generally not admissible on the
ground that it lacks trustworthiness for two
basic reasons: (1) the person who purports to
know the facts is not stating them under oath;
(2) t h a t person is not present for cross-examination. State v. Sibert, 6 Utah 2d 198, 310 R2d
388 (1957).
In a husband's and wife's breach of contract
suit against lawyers for the opposing parties in
an earlier lawsuit, following a mediation agreement from the underlying misappropriation
action against the husband, denial of the lawyers'motion for partial summary judgment was
improper as the mediation confidentiality
agreement unambiguously prohibited disclosure of any mediation contents, which included
the wife's hearsay testimony regarding the purported acceptance of her settlement offer to the
extent that such testimony was used to support
the breach of contract claim. Because the mediator's statement regarding the lawyers' purDorted acceptance of the wife's settlement was

Chemical b r e a t h analysis.
Section 41-6-44.3, governing the admission of
chemical breath analysis, is a valid statutory
exception to the hearsay rule. Layton City v.
Bennett, 741 P.2d 965 (Utah Ct. App. 1987),
cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1988).
Nonhearsay.
Police officer's recounting of victim's report of
the crime was not hearsay because it was not
presented for t h e truth of the matter, but to
explain why the officer took the investigative
steps that he did. State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539
(Utah Ct. App. 1998).
Purpose.
The hearsay rule has as its declared purpose
the exclusion of evidence not subject to crossexamination concerning the truthfulness of the
matters asserted. State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483
(Utah 1986).
Cited in Johnson v. Hermes Assocs., 2005 UT
82, 128 R3d 1151.

ADDENDUM
L

Rule 803

UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE

790

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — The Unconstitutionality of Statutes of Limitation on Habeus Corpus Relief and the Need for Reliability Findings
for Child Victims' Out-of Court Statements,
1998 Utah L Rev 619
Journal of Contemporary Law. — Com-

ment, Victims of Child Sexual Abuse m the
Courtroom New Utah Rules and Their Constitutional Implications, 15 J Contemp L 81
(1989)
A.L.R. — Validity, construction, and apphcation of child hearsay statutes, 71A L R 5th 637

Rule 803. Hearsay exceptions; availability of declarant
immaterial.
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the
declarant is available as a witness:
(1) Present sense impression. A statement describing or explaining an event
or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition or
immediately thereafter.
(2) Excited utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or condition
made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the
event or condition.
(3) Then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition. A statement of
the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical
condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily
health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact
remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation, identification, or terms of declarant's will.
(4) Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. Statements
made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical
history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or
general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably
pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.
(5) Recorded recollection. A memorandum or record concerning a matter
about which a witness once had knowledge but now has insufficient recollection to enable the witness to testify fully and accurately, shown to have been
made or adopted by the witness when the matter was fresh in the witness'
memory and to reflect that knowledge correctly. If admitted, the memorandum
or record may be read into evidence but may not itself be received as an exhibit
unless offered by an adverse party.
(6) Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, report, record,
or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions or
diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a
person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business
activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the
memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the
testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, or by certification that
complies with Rule 902(11), Rules 902(12), or a statute permitting certification,
unless the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation
indicate lack of trustworthiness. The term "business" as used in this paragraph
includes business, institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling
of every kind, whether or not conducted for profit.
(7) Absence of entry in records kept in accordance with the provisions of
paragraph (6). Evidence that a matter is not included in the memoranda,
reports, records, or data compilations, in any form, kept in accordance with the
provisions of Paragraph (6), to prove the nonoccurrence or nonexistence of the
matter, if the matter was of a kind of which a memorandum, report, record, or
data compilation was regularly made and preserved, unless the sources of
information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.
(8) Public records and reports. Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form, of nublic office ^ «~—-*--
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of the office or agency, or (B) matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law
as to which matters there was a duty to report, excluding, however, in criminal
cases matters observed by police officers and other law enforcement personnel,
or (C) in civil actions and proceedings and against the Government in criminal
cases, factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to
authority granted by law, unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.
(9) Records of vital statistics. Records or data compilations, in any form, of
births, fetal deaths, deaths, or marriages, if the report thereof was made to a
public office pursuant to requirements of lav/.
(10) Absence of public record or entry. To prove the absence of a record,
report, statement, or data compilation, in any form, or the nonoccurrence or
nonexistence of a matter of which a record, report, statement, or data
compilation in any form, was regularly made and preserved by a public office
or agency, evidence in the form of a certification in accordance with Rule 902,
or testimony, that diligent search failed to disclose the record, report, statement, or d a t a compilation, or entry.
(11) Records of religious organization. Statements of births, marriages,
divorces, deaths, legitimacy, ancestry, relationship by blood or marriage, or
other similar facts of personal or family history, contained in a regularly kept
record of a religious organization.
(12) Marriage, baptismal, and similar certificates. Statements of fact contained in a certificate that the maker performed a marriage or other ceremony
or administered a sacrament, made by a clergyman, public official, or other
person authorized by the rules or practices of a religious organization or by law
to perform the act certified, and purporting to have been issued at the time of
the act or within a reasonable time thereafter.
(13) Family records. Statements of fact concerning personal or famtly
history contained in family Bibles, genealogies, charts, engravings on rings,
inscriptions on family portraits, engravings on urns, crypts, or tombstones, or
the like.
(14) Records of documents affecting an interest in property. The record of a
document purporting to establish or affect an interest in property, as proof of
the content of the original recorded document and its execution and delivery by
each person by whom it purports to have been executed, if the record is a record
of a public office and an applicable statute authorizes the recording of
documents of that kind in t h a t office.
(15) Statements in documents affecting an interest in property. A statement
contained in a document purporting to establish or affect an interest in
property if the matter stated was relevant to the purpose of the document,
unless dealings with the property since the document was made have been
inconsistent with the truth of the statement or the purport of the document.
(16) Statements in ancient documents Statements in a document in existence twenty years or more the authenticity of which is established.
(17) Market reports, commercial publications. Market quotations, tabulations, lists, directories, or other published compilations, generally used and
relied upon by the public or by persons in particular occupations.
(18) Learned treatises. To the extent called to the attention of an expert
witness upon cross-examination or relied upon by the expert witness in direct
examination, statements contained in published treatises, periodicals, or
pamphlets on a subject of history, medicine, or other science or art, established
as a reliable authority by the testimony or admission of the witness or by other
expert testimony or by judicial notice. If admitted, the statements may be read
into evidence but may not be received as exhibits.
(19) Reputation concerning personal or family history. Reputation among
members of a person's family by blood, adoption, or marriage, or among a
person's associates, or in the community, concerning a person's birth, adoption,
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marriage, divorce, death, legitimacy, relationship by blood, adoption, or marriage, ancestry, or other similar fact of personal or family history.
(20) Reputation concerning boundaries or general history. Reputation in a
community arising before the controversy, as to boundaries of or customs
affecting lands in the community, and reputation as to events of general
history important to the community or State or nation in which located.
(21) Reputation as to character. Reputation of a person's character among
associates or in the community.
(22) Judgment of previous conviction. Evidence of a final judgment, entered
after a trial or upon a plea of guilty (but not upon a plea of nolo contendere),
adjudging a person guilty of a crime punishable by death or imprisonment in
excess of one year, to prove any fact essential to sustain the judgment, but not
including, when offered by the prosecution in a criminal prosecution for
purposes other t h a n impeachment, judgments against persons other t h a n the
accused. The pendency of an appeal may be shown but does not affect
admissibility
(23) Judgment as to personal, family or general history, or boundaries.
Judgments as proof of matters of personal, family or general history, or
boundaries, essential to the judgment, if the same would be provable by
evidence of reputation.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992; November 1, 2001; November 1, 2004.)
Advisory C o m m i t t e e Note. — This rule is
t h e federal rule verbatim. The 2001 amendment adopts changes made to Federal Rule of
Evidence 803(6) effective December 1, 2000.
C r o s s - R e f e r e n c e s . — Affidavits admissible
in hearing on motion, Rule 43(b), U.R C.P.
Affidavits, taking and certification of, § 78B5-701 et seq.
Contemporaneous entries and writings of decedent as prima facie evidence, § 78B-5-607.
Historical works, books of science and art,

and published maps and charts as evidence,
§ 78B-5-605.
Judgment, entry of, Rule 58A, U.R.C.P.
Judgment roll in criminal case, contents and
filing, U.R.Crim.R 22.
Marriage certificate, issuance and filing,
§§ 30-1-6, 30-1-12.
Official records as evidence, § 78B-5-602;
Rule 44, U.R.C.P.
Recording conveyances, § 57-3-101 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Business records.
Commercial publications.
Excited utterances.
Harmless error.
Learned treatises.
Medical diagnosis or treatment.
Nonhearsay.
Present sense impression.
Public records and reports.
Records of regularly conducted activities.
Then existing mental, emotional, or physical
condition.
Cited.
B u s i n e s s records.
Computer printouts made by driver's license
division can be admitted to show a driver's
accumulated point totals as part of the business
records exception to t h e hearsay rule. Barney v.
Cox, 588 P.2d 696 (Utah 1978).
Summary based on books and records kept in
t h e normal course of the business, but which
itselfwas not made in t h e regular course of the
business, did not qualify as a business records
exception to the hearsay rule. Shurtleff v. J a y
Tuft & Co., 622 R2d 1168 (Utah 1980).
For evidence to be admissible as a business
record, a proper foundation must be laid to
establish t h e necessary indicia of reliability,
which foundation should generally include the

following: the record must be made in the
regular course of the business or entity which
keeps the record; the record must have been
made at the time of, or in close proximity to, the
occurrence of the act, condition or event recorded; the evidence must support a conclusion
t h a t after recordation the document was kept
under circumstances that would preserve its
integrity, and the sources of the information
from which the entry was made and the circumstances of the preparation of the document
were such as to indicate its trustworthiness.
State v. Bertul, 664 P.2d 1181 (Utah 1983).
An arresting officer's sworn driving under
the influence report form was not admissible
under the business records exception of Subdivision (6), where it lacked proper foundation
because neither the arresting officer nor the
custodian of police records testified t h a t the
report was prepared in the regular course of
business, contemporaneously with the arrest.
Kehl v. Schwendiman, 735 R2d 413 (Utah
1987).
Section 41-6-44.3 governs the admissibility of
chemical breath tests as business records. Inasmuch as § 41-6-44.3 allows affidavits to establish the necessary foundation for breathalyzer evidence, it is less restrictive t h a n thp
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Rule 805. Hearsay within hearsay.
Hearsay included within hearsay is not excluded under the hearsay rule if
each part of the combined statements conforms with an exception to the
hearsay rule provided in these rules.
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is
the federal rule, verbatim A similar provision

was contained in Rule 66, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971)

NOTES TO DECISIONS
P u b l i c record or report c o n t a i n i n g hearsay.
In a dispositional hearing, a predisposition
report prepared by a Division of Child and
Family Services caseworker was admissible as
a public record or report, but, because it was

based on double hearsay information, the court
could not base its disposition solely on the
report J S v State, 939 P 2 d 196 (Utah Ct
App 1997), cert denied, 953 P 2 d 449 (Utah
1997)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 29 Am J u r 2d Evidence
§ 496

C.J.S. — 31A C J S Evidence § 280

Rule 806. Attacking and supporting credibility of declarant.
When a hearsay statement, or a statement defined in Rule 801(d)(2), (C), (D),
or (E), has been admitted in evidence, the credibility of the declarant may be
attacked, and if attacked may be supported, by any evidence which would be
admissible for those purposes if declarant had testified as a witness. Evidence
of a statement or conduct by the declarant at any time, inconsistent with the
declarant's hearsay statement, is not subject to any requirement that the
declarant may have been afforded an opportunity to deny or explain. If the
party against whom a hearsay statement has been admitted calls the declarant
as a witness, the party is entitled to examine the declarant on the statement
as if under cross-examination.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is
the federal rule, verbatim Rule 65, Utah Rules

of Evidence (1971), contained a comparable
provision

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
U t a h L a w Review. — U t a h Rules of Evidence 1983 — Part III, 1995 U t a h L Rev 683
Am. Jur. 2d. — 29 Am J u r 2d Evidence
§§ 254, 267 et seq

C.J.S. — 31A C J S Evidence § 337 et seq

Rule 807. Other exceptions.
A statement not specifically covered by Rule 803 or Rule 804 but having
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness is not excluded by the
hearsay rule if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as
evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for
which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure
through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purpose of these rules and the
interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into
evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under this exception
unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in
advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair
opportunity to prepare to meet it, the proponent's intention to offer the
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statement and the particulars of it, including the n a m e and address of t h e
declarant.
(Added effective November 1, 2004.)
Advisory Committee N o t e . — This rule
transfers identical provisions Rule 803(24) and
Rule 804(b)(5) to a new Rule 807 to reflect the

organization found in the Federal Rules of
Evidence. No substantive change is intended.
This rule is the federal rule, verbatim.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Under former Rule 803(24).
Subdivision (24), unlike the other enumerated hearsay exceptions, did not apply to a
particular class or type of statement, but was
intended for use in those rare cases in which,
although the out-of-court statement does not fit
into a recognized exception, its admission is
justified by the inherent reliability of the statement and the need for its admission State v.
Nelson, 777 R2d 479 (Utah 1989).
j j.
•
i ^
A. i
J. - a T
In determining whether a statement is suni. n
, - , , Jr
O I T n r
ciently reliable for purposes of former Subdivision (24) a court should examine, among other
factors: (1) the probable motivation of the declarant in making the statement; (2) the circumstances under which the statement was
made; and (3) the knowledge and qualifications
of the declarant. Additional factors that may be
considered include (1) the character of the declarant for truthfulness and honesty and the
availability of evidence on the issue; (2)
whether t h e statement was given voluntarily,
under oath, subject to cross examination and a
penalty for perjury; (3) the extent to which the
declarant's statement reflects his personal
knowledge; (4) whether the declarant ever re-

canted his statement, and (5) whether the
declarant's statement was insufficiently corroborated. State v. Webster, 2001 UT App 238, 32
P-3d 976.
Because an admissibility decision under Subdivision (24) required the application of facts to
the le
p * requirements of the rule, the trial
?ourt h a d some discretion in making thatP P de^^TA
^ ' \^h
££?<£?
'
47
f U ^ , A d v ; R ^ 14/ 7 3 / f 9 7 L . .
f
A child s out-of-court videotaped statements
u , i
4. *• *u >
±*. • i
about her stepfather s actions were material
^ ^ S u b d i v i s i o n ( 2 4 )(A) b e c a u s e t h e a c t i o n s
were ^
b a g i s for ^
fathej,s
t i t i o n for a
p r o t e c t i v e o r d e r a g a i n s t t h e s t e pfather. However>

becauge

there

was

no

evidence

parties> briefSj t h e t r i a l r e c o r d ) or t h e

m

the

findings

a b o u t w h y t h e child w a s n o t called to testifyj

the

record was inadequate to show either t h a t t h e
out-of-court statements were more probative
than the in-court testimony of the child would
have been or t h a t the general purpose of t h e
Rules of Evidence and the interests of justice
were served by admitting the statements into
evidence, as required by Subdivisions (24)(B)
and (C). N.D. v. A.B., 2003 UT App 215, 476
Utah Adv. Rep. 14, 73 P.3d 971.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Uniform Evidence Rule 803(24):
the residual hearsay exception, 51 A.L.R.4th
999.

Residual hearsay exception where declarant
unavailable: Uniform Evidence Rule 804(b)(5),
75 A.L.R.4th 199.

ARTICLE IX. AUTHENTICATION AND IDENTIFICATION
Rule 901. Requirement of authentication or identification.
(a) General provision. The requirement of authentication or identification as
a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to
support a finding t h a t the matter in question is what its proponent claims.
(b) Illustrations. By way of illustration only, and not by way of limitation,
the following are examples of authentication or identification conforming with
the requirements of this rule:
(b)(1) Testimony of witness with knowledge. Testimony that a matter is w h a t
it is claimed to be.
(b)(2) Nonexpert opinion on handwriting.
Nonexpert opinion as to the
genuineness of handwriting, based upon familiarity not acquired for purposes
of the litigation.
(b)(3) Comparison by trier or expert witness. Comparison by the trier of fact
or by expert witnesses with specimens which have been authenticated.

